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I. INTRODUCTION
2010 marks the fifteenth anniversary of the entering into force of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights1 (TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
When the Agreement was drafted, commentators quickly extolled the
unprecedented benefits of having a set of multilateral enforcement
norms built into the international intellectual property regime.2 For
US–China Panel Report: Findings and Implications for the Future of IPRs Enforcement” in Geneva organized by UNCTAD and the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), the “International Dialogue on
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism” in Beijing organized by ICTSD, the 16th,
17th, and 18th Fordham Annual International Intellectual Property and Policy
Conferences at Fordham University School of Law, two Distinguished Professor
Presentations at John Marshall Law School, the “IP Enforcement and Awareness
Raising in Asia” Conference at the Centre for Comparative Law and Development Studies in Asia and the Pacific in the University of Wollongong, the Regional Capacity Building in Intellectual Property Law Scholarship Programme in
the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore, the 2008 Scholarly
Symposia Series at the University of Dayton School of Law, the “Intellectual
Property Developments in China: Global Challenge, Local Voices” Conference at
Drake University Law School, the 12th Overseas Young Chinese Forum Annual
Meeting organized by the University of Chicago Center for East Asian Studies,
the “Legal Issues in Supply Chain Management” Conference at Vanderbilt University Law School, the “Beyond TRIPS: The Current Push for Greater International Enforcement of Intellectual Property” Conference at American University
Washington College of Law, the 2009 International Law Weekend in New York,
the International Law Weekend—West at Willamette University College of Law,
the Roundtable on Intellectual Property, Media and Competition Law in the
Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong, the Workshop on “Protecting and
Enforcing Your IP rights in China: Practical Solutions from the Experts” organized by the European Chamber of Commerce, the “Doing Business in China:
Resolving Today’s Challenges” Workshop at PLI New York City Center, and a
lecture at Fudan University School of Law. The Author would like to thank
Christoph Antons, Margaret Blair, Michael Carroll, Anne Cheung, John Du,
Sean Flynn, Richard Gruner, Hugh Hansen, Christopher Heath, Paul Heald,
Kelly Henrici, Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Ahmed Abdel Latif, Liu Sida, James
Nafziger, Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Pedro Roffe, and Sun Su for their kind invitations
and hospitality and to the participants of these events, in particular Christoph
Antons, James Bacchus, Mark Cohen, Victoria Espinel, Daniel Gervais, Jennifer
Groves, Richard Gruner, Paul Heald, Justin Hughes, Patricia Judd, Atul
Kaushik, the late Sir Hugh Laddie, Daryl Lim, Doris Long, Li Mingde, Li Xuan,
Stanford McCoy, Wolf Meier-Ewert, Sisule Musungu, Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Joost
Pauwelyn, Louise Pentland, Eric Smith, Sun Haochen, Wang Qian, Xue Hong,
Geoffrey Yu, and Zhang Naigen, for their valuable comments, suggestions, and
helpful exchanges. He is also grateful to Elaine Newby, Lindsey Purdy, and
Megan Snyder for excellent research and editorial assistance.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2. See Panel Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, ¶ 8.97, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Section 211 Panel Report]
(“The inclusion of [Part III] on enforcement in the TRIPS Agreement was one of
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many, the introduction of the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process was a, if not the, crowning achievement of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations (Uruguay Round).3
Notwithstanding these high praises, the purported major strength
of the TRIPS Agreement, oxymoronically, turns out to be also a major
weakness. Unlike the substantive provisions in the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property4 and the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works5 (Berne Convention),
the two century-old international intellectual property agreements
that have now been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement,6 the
TRIPS enforcement provisions were rather new and primitive. As Je-

3.

4.
5.
6.

the major accomplishments of the Uruguay Round negotiations as it expanded
the scope of enforcement aspect of intellectual property rights. Prior to the
TRIPS Agreement, provisions related to enforcement were limited to general obligations to provide legal remedies and seizure of infringing goods.”); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 440 (3d ed. 2008)
(“The enforcement section of the TRIPS Agreement is clearly one of the major
achievements of the negotiation.”); UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS
AND DEVELOPMENT 629 (2005) [hereinafter TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK] (“The introduction of a detailed set of enforcement rules as part of TRIPS has been . . . one of
the major innovations of this Agreement.”); Carlos M. Correa, The Push for
Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for Developing Countries, in INT’L CTR.
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27, 34 (2009) [hereinafter GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT] (“The
TRIPS Agreement is the first international treaty on IPRs that has included specific norms on the enforcement of IPRs.” (footnote omitted)); Adrian Otten &
Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 403 (1996) (“[The enforcement] rules constitute the first time
in any area of international law that such rules on domestic enforcement procedures and remedies have been negotiated.”); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323,
366 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents] (“Part III of the TRIPS
Agreement delineated international standards for the enforcement of intellectual
property rights for the first time, including civil, administrative, and criminal
procedures and remedies and measures related to border control.”).
See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years,
8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 32 (2005) [hereinafter Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement
System] (“Dispute settlement is one of the great successes of the WTO.”); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275,
275 (1997) (noting that the two achievements of the Uruguay Round are, as the
title suggests, “Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together”); Ruth Okediji,
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75,
149–50 (2000) (“One of the most celebrated accomplishments of the WTO system
is the dispute resolution mechanism which adds legitimacy to the overall design
of the new trading system.” (footnote omitted)).
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised
at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
See TRIPS Agreement arts. 2, 9.
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rome Reichman and David Lange observed, the enforcement procedures “on closer inspection appear to constitute a set of truly
minimum standards of due process on which future legislation will
have to build.”7 It is small wonder that Professors Reichman and
Lange have considered Part III of the Agreement its “Achilles’ heel.”8
After more than a decade of implementation, the effectiveness of
the enforcement provisions in the TRIPS Agreement was finally called
into question before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). In
January 2009, the DSB released an important panel report on the
U.S.–China dispute over the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement.9 In this report, a
WTO panel, for the first time, focused primarily on the interpretation
and implementation of the TRIPS enforcement provisions.10 In addition to examining in great detail and depth the obligations under Articles 41,11 46,12 59,13 and 6114 of the TRIPS Agreement, the panel also
briefly explored the implications of Articles 1.115 and 41.5,16 the two
provisions that are highly important to less developed countries—
which include, in WTO parlance, both developing and least developed
countries.
7. J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The
Case for Ongoing Public–Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual
Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 34 (1998).
8. Id. at 34–40 (explaining why the enforcement provisions are the “Achilles’ heel of
the TRIPS Agreement”); accord Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’
Heel] (same). As Professors Reichman and Lange observed, “[T]he enforcement
provisions are crafted as broad legal standards, rather than as narrow rules, and
their inherent ambiguity will make it harder for mediators or dispute-settlement
panels to pin down clear-cut violations of international law.” Reichman & Lange,
supra note 7, at 35. They further predicted that “the level of enforcement under
the TRIPS Agreement will greatly disappoint rightsholders in the developed
countries, and that recourse to coercive measures will not appreciably improve
the situation in the short and medium terms.” Id. at 38–39.
9. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report].
10. This panel report, however, is not the first one involving a TRIPS provision concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights. In United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, the WTO panel and subsequently
the Appellate Body examined Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998 in relation to Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement. Section 211 Panel
Report, supra note 2, ¶¶ 8.92–.102; Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶¶ 203–32, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan.
2, 2002) [hereinafter Section 211 Appellate Body Report].
11. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶¶ 7.161–.181, 7.676–.680.
12. See id. ¶¶ 7.255–.285, 7.356–.394.
13. See id. ¶¶ 7.197–.394.
14. See id. ¶¶ 7.182–.185, 7.480–.675.
15. See id. ¶¶ 7.198–.199, 7.511–.513.
16. See id. ¶¶ 7.591–.599.
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The release of this panel report cannot be timelier for researchers
who study closely the international intellectual property regime. In
the past few years, developed countries—in particular the United
States, the European Union, Japan, and Switzerland—have been actively pushing for the development of new international intellectual
property enforcement norms through bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements.17 These countries were also the main drivers of the highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), which utilized a “country club” approach to strengthen international intellectual property enforcement norms.18 Commentators
have heavily criticized that approach for undermining the integrity of
the existing international trading system.19
Meanwhile, less developed countries successfully established various development agendas at the WTO, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), as well as other international fora.20 At the
WTO, for example, the initiation of the Doha Development Round of
Trade Negotiations has led to the adoption of the Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health21 (Doha Declaration) and the
unprecedented acceptance of a protocol to formally amend the TRIPS
Agreement.22 A few years later, WIPO followed suit by establishing a
WIPO Development Agenda,23 which included the adoption of fortyfive recommendations for actions, ranging from technical assistance
and capacity building to norm setting and public policy, and from technology transfer to assessment, evaluation, and impact studies.24
17. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 2, at 392–400 (discussing the
growing use of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements); Peter K.
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements] (critically examining the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements).
18. For an overview of the many concerns in ACTA, see generally Peter K. Yu, Six
Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears].
19. See id.
20. For a discussion of the development agendas at different international fora, see
generally Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
465, 511–40 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas].
21. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
22. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm; see also
Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 872–86
(2007) [hereinafter Yu, The International Enclosure Movement] (tracing the development of proposed Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement).
23. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Proposal to Establish a Development
Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11,
IIM/1/4 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/
iim_1/iim_1_4.pdf.
24. Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO
(Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article
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Outside the multilateral fora, the WTO panel report also has important ramifications for bilateral or plurilateral state-to-state negotiations—most notably those between China and the United States.
Because the lack of intellectual property protection and enforcement
has been the subject of perennial disputes between China and the
United States since China reopened the country to foreign trade in the
late 1970s,25 the panel report also provides policymakers and commentators with a rare opportunity to fully evaluate the use of the
WTO approach to enhance protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights in China. This new approach did not exist before
China joined the international trading body in December 2001;26 at
that time, the United States had to rely on threats of trade sanctions,
threats of non-renewal of most favored nation status, and opposition
to China’s entry into the WTO to induce China to strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement.27
This Article provides an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of
the WTO panel report on China—Measures Affecting the Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. It focuses on the lessons the WTO panel report has provided to policymakers, commentators, and intellectual property rights holders. It also advances a novel
_0071.html; see also WIPO, The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO
Development Agenda, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommen
dations.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (listing all the forty-five recommendations). The six different clusters include: (1) technical assistance and capacity
building; (2) norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and public domain; (3) technology transfer, information and communication technologies and access to
knowledge; (4) assessment, evaluation and impact studies; (5) institutional matters including mandate and governance; and (6) other issues. Id.
25. For discussions of ongoing disputes between China and the United States over
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, see generally Peter
K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates
to Partners]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter
Yu, From Pirates to Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic
Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS
ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, The China Puzzle].
26. On December 11, 2001, China formally became the 143rd member of the WTO.
See generally Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects,
17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2 (2003) (remarks of the Author) (discussing the ramifications of China’s entry into the WTO).
27. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 903. China’s WTO accession, however, has made many of these aggressive measures unavailable to the
United States. See id. at 904. Instead, the United States now has to rely on the
WTO process, which includes good offices, consultations, negotiations, dispute
settlement, and arbitration. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 5–6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401,
405–406.
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argument that the outcome of the present dispute reflects the common
mistakes foreign businesses in China have made. This Article demonstrates that the present panel report is unlikely to result in dramatic
improvements in intellectual property protection and enforcement in
China. It underscores the importance of this report for not only intellectual property rights holders, but also those who study China and
Chinese law as well as those who intend to conduct business in the
Middle Kingdom.
Part II of the Article discusses the key arguments made by China
and the United States as well as the major findings in the WTO panel
report. Part III focuses on the remedial actions China has undertaken
in an effort to bring its laws into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. This Part explores the limitations of the panel report in providing intellectual property rights holders with meaningful protection.
Conscious of these limitations, Part IV examines the key benefits of
the WTO panel report to the United States, China, and other less developed countries. Part V outlines the many lessons the report has
provided for intellectual property rights holders. It concludes with
some concrete suggestions on how to revamp the United States’ intellectual property enforcement strategy vis-à-vis China.
II. THE DISPUTE
In April 2007, the United States requested consultations with
China concerning China’s failure to protect and enforce intellectual
property rights pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement.28 As the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) stated in its press release: “Over the past several years China has taken tangible steps to
improve IPR protection and enforcement. However, we still see important gaps that need to be addressed. We will pursue this legal dispute in the WTO and will continue to work with China bilaterally on
other important IPR issues.”29
Although the United States framed the complaint as a gap-filling
exercise, China had a rather different reaction to the complaint. As
the spokesperson of China’s permanent mission to the WTO declared:
For nearly 30 years and particularly since joining the WTO in 2001, China
has spared no efforts to improve its IPR legislation, and now the legislation is
in full accordance with WTO rules. . . .
28. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr.
16, 2007) [hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Complaint].
29. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. [USTR], United States Requests
WTO Panel in Case Challenging Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property
Rights Laws (Aug. 13, 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/press-releases/archives/2007/august/united-states-requests-wto-panel-casechal.
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By initiating the case, the United States is actually trying to change the
WTO legal structure on IPR protection, with an attempt to impose extra obligations on developing members . . . .30

While some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States
should file a WTO complaint over a lack of enforcement of intellectual
property rights based on a general impression,31 the USTR eventually
filed a much narrower complaint challenging Chinese intellectual
property laws on only an “as such” basis.32 This complaint focused on
four particular issues: (1) the high thresholds for criminal procedures
and penalties in the intellectual property area;33 (2) the failure of the
Chinese customs authorities to properly dispose of infringing goods
seized at the border;34 (3) the denial of copyright protection to works
that have not been authorized for publication or dissemination within
30. WTO Panel to Probe U.S.–China Dispute on IPR Protection, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Sept. 25, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-09/26/content_
6792520.htm.
31. For example, Patrick Mulloy, a commissioner of the U.S.–China Economic and
Security Review Commission, declared:
My thought is that we ought to bring the WTO case the best way we can
bring it. We don’t care what the multinationals say. Bring the case because it’s in the national interest to bring it.
Then if you lose it, and the problem continues, then you got [sic] to
say, well, [the TRIPS Agreement] doesn’t work, we have to develop other
instruments . . . .
Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: Hearing
Before the U.S.–China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 109th Cong. 226 (2006)
[hereinafter U.S.C.C. Hearing], available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006
hearings/transcripts/june7_8/06_06_7_8_trans.pdf (remarks of Patrick A. Mulloy,
Comm’r, U.S.–China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n).
32. As the Appellate Body declared in United States—Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan:
When a measure is challenged “as such”, the starting point for an
analysis must be the measure on its face. If the meaning and content of
the measure are clear on its face, then the consistency of the measure as
such can be assessed on that basis alone. If, however, the meaning or
content of the measure is not evident on its face, further examination is
required.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, ¶ 168, WT/DS244/
AB/R (Dec. 15, 2003). But see Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023,
1059 (2009) (“Given the lack of detail in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more of a non-violation complaint. The essence of what the USA
was really complaining about was that a benefit it expected from the TRIPS
Agreement was better levels of enforcement.”); Daniel Gervais, China—Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM.
J. INT’L L. 549, 549 (2009) [hereinafter Gervais, China—IP Measures] (noting
that the WTO panel’s analysis may have “blurred both the traditional distinction
between ‘as such’ and ‘as applied’ claims and the line separating TRIPS violations
from non-violations”).
33. See TRIPS Enforcement Complaint, supra note 28, at 1–2.
34. See id. at 3.
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China;35 and (4) the unavailability of criminal procedures and penalties for infringing activities that involved either reproduction or distribution, but not both.36
On the same day when the TRIPS enforcement complaint was
filed, the United States initiated another complaint over the denial of
trading rights and market access for distribution services for publications, sound recordings, and audiovisual entertainment products.37
Specifically, the complaint stated China’s failure to honor the commitments to “fully open the right to trade . . . within three years after
accession,” as explicitly stated in the Accession Protocol.38 Although
the second complaint was technically different from the TRIPS enforcement complaint, focusing primarily on market access, it served as
a strategic reminder of the interrelationship between intellectual
property protection and market access.
The United States’ decision to simultaneously file the two complaints is understandable. A strong information control policy will result in the reduced competitiveness of U.S. cultural and
entertainment products.39 Because of censorship and distribution restrictions, many American copyrighted products, movies in particular,
fail to obtain approval despite their undeniable success in foreign markets.40 Because rights holders are unable to distribute their products
in China, consumers have to resort to other channels of dissemination
or settle for goods in the black market.41 Although these substitutes
are often inferior to the genuine products, many consumers do not
have counterparts with which to compare or from which to select.42
As time passes, the Chinese market becomes saturated with unauthorized substitutes.43 By the time the market barriers are finally removed, foreign rights holders will have great difficulty entering the
market.44
35. See id. at 3–6.
36. See id. at 6.
37. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/1 (Apr. 16, 2007).
38. Id. at 2.
39. See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: Using Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.–China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 31–32
(2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives].
40. For discussions of the quota on the importation of foreign movies to China, see
generally Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 291–96 (1999); Carl Erik Heiberg, Note, American Films
in China: An Analysis of China’s Intellectual Property Record and Reconsideration of Cultural Trade Exceptions Amidst Rampant Piracy, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L.
219, 233–37 (2006).
41. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 39, at 31–32.
42. See id. at 31.
43. See id. at 32.
44. See id.
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By August 2007, the consultations between the two parties had yet
to resolve most of the dispute. The only issue that was resolved concerned a clarification of Article 217 of the Criminal Law through the
2007 Judicial Interpretation on the Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights (2007 Judicial Interpretation),45 which
permitted the word “and” to be interpreted as “and/or.”46 As a result,
the United States requested the establishment of a panel to examine
only the three remaining claims.47
Because the two parties failed to reach a consensus on how the
panel was to be composed, the WTO Director-General named the three
panel members pursuant to WTO rules.48 Serving as chair was
Adrian Macey, a New Zealand diplomat who was involved in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO negotiations during the Uruguay Round. Rounding out the panel were Marino Porzio,
a Chilean lawyer who served as WIPO Deputy Director-General during 1980–1987, and the late Sivakant Tiwari, a Singaporean government attorney who chaired the APEC Intellectual Property Rights
Experts’ Group.49 In addition to China and the United States, the dispute involved twelve third parties—namely, Argentina, Australia,
45. Interpretation II of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate of the Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in
Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights
(
) (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Apr. 5, 2007, and the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Apr. 5, 2007, effective on Apr. 5, 2007), http://
www.lawinfochina.com/NetLaw/display.aspx?db=1&id=5983 (China) [hereinafter
2007 Judicial Interpretation].
46. See id. art. 2 (noting that, for the purpose of Article 217 of the Criminal law, the
term “reproduce [/] distribute”’ means to reproduce, distribute, or reproduce and
distribute); see also Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.–China
WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 119 n.99, 124
(2008) (noting the clarification); Xue Hong, An Anatomical Study of the United
States Versus China at the World Trade Organisation on Intellectual Property
Enforcement, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 292, 293 n.12 (2009) (noting the clarification); Zhu Lanye & Liu Jiarui, Sino-US Intellectual Property Dispute: A New
Chapter in WTO History, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 194, 199–200 (2008) (discussing the phrase “fuzhi faxing” in Article 217 of the Criminal Law).
47. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China—Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/
DS362/7 (Aug. 21, 2007).
48. Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States,
China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 3, WT/DS362/8 (Dec. 13, 2007); see also William J. Davey, Dispute
Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 343, 346 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds.,
2006) (“In practice, [the parties] are usually unable to agree on all three [panel
members], with the result that the panel selection is completed by the WTO Director-General on request of one of the parties.”).
49. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 1.5.
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Brazil, Canada, the European Communities, India, Japan, Mexico,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.50 After a request for an
extension of the original deadline, the WTO panel released its longawaited interim report in October 2008.51 The release of a 135-page
final report followed three months later.
Due to space constraints, this Part does not provide an in-depth
discussion of all the claims made in the dispute or all the findings of
the WTO panel. Instead, it summarizes the key claims made by China
and the United States as well as the panel’s major findings. Unlike
the panel report, which reversed the order of the claims in the complaint, this Part discusses the claims in the order stated in the original complaint.
A.

Thresholds for Criminal Procedures and Penalties

The first claim concerned the thresholds for criminal procedures
and penalties. Many commentators and rights holders considered it
the most important claim in the dispute.52 Article 61 of the TRIPS
Agreement states: “Members shall provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”53 Because each
WTO member is required to apply criminal procedures and penalties
to all cases involving “wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright
piracy on a commercial scale,” the United States claimed that China
had failed to honor its TRIPS commitments by including in its laws
high thresholds for applying criminal procedures and penalties to intellectual property infringement.54
Consider, for example, the provision for criminal copyright infringement. Article 217 of the Criminal Law states:
Whoever, for the purpose of making profits, commits any of the [specified]
acts of infringement on copyright shall, if the amount of illegal gains is relatively large, or if there are other serious circumstances, be sentenced to fixedterm imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and
shall also, or shall only, be fined; if the amount of illegal gains is huge or if
there are other especially serious circumstances, [the offender] shall be sen-

50. Id. ¶ 1.6.
51. Id. ¶ 1.8.
52. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 46, at 118–19 (contending that the criminal thresholds claim is “the most significant claim in the United States’ complaint”); Joost
Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property
Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 389, 414 (2010) (pointing out
that the criminal threshold claim “was no doubt its most important claim in this
dispute”).
53. TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
54. See TRIPS Enforcement Complaint, supra note 28, at 1–2.
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tenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more
than seven years and shall also be fined . . . .55

Although the provision neither stipulates the amount of illegal gains
nor defines such phrases as “relatively large” or “serious circumstances,” Article 5 of the 2004 Judicial Interpretation on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases of
Infringing Intellectual Property establishes the amount for “relatively
large” as not less than 30,000 Yuan56—about US$4,500 at the time of
the panel report. Article 1 of the 2007 Judicial Interpretation further
defines “other serious circumstances” as actions taken by anybody
who, “for the purpose of making profits, reproduces/distributes, without permission of the copyright owner, a written work, musical work,
cinematographic work, television or video works, computer software
and other works of not less than 500 zhang [copies] in total.”57
Adopted a few days before the filing of the WTO complaint and in direct response to U.S. pressure, the threshold reduced the number of
copies by half from 1000.
The United States argued that those thresholds, along with other
thresholds concerning “illegal business operation volume, amount of
illegal gains (or profits), amount of sales, number of ‘copies’ and ‘other
serious circumstances,’ ”58 provided a safe harbor to shelter pirates
and counterfeiters from criminal prosecution.59 In the United States’
view, China failed to provide criminal enforcement and legal remedies
as required by Articles 61 and 41.1, respectively, of the TRIPS
Agreement.
The United States’ active push for greater criminal enforcement in
China can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, due to the high
costs incurred in enforcing intellectual property rights, the more a
country is required to criminalize infringing activities, the more the

55. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (
) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct.
1, 1997), art. 217, http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/
2011-02/11/content_21899017.htm [hereinafter Chinese Criminal Law].
56. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringing Intellectual Property (
)
(adopted by the Supreme People’s Court, Nov. 2, 2004, and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, Nov. 11, 2004, effective Dec. 22, 2004), art. 5, http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182471 (China).
57. 2007 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 45, art. 1, as quoted in TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.411.
58. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.451.
59. See id. ¶ 7.478.
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costs and risks of protection will shift from private rights holders to
national governments.60
Second, rights holders can consider criminal enforcement as a supplementary option (in addition to civil enforcement, mediation, and arbitration). The existence of the criminal enforcement option for
foreign rights holders in China is particularly important, considering
the many complaints they have voiced over the low penalties handed
down by Chinese courts.61 As foreign businesses often observe, you
can win the lawsuit but still lose money in China. Thus, many American rights holders remain reluctant to fund litigation efforts that most
likely will not result in meaningful compensation.
Finally, a number of rights holders sincerely believe that strong
criminal enforcement would provide the much-needed deterrent to reduce piracy and counterfeiting.62 As a result, criminal enforcement is
a key component of not only the U.S.–China intellectual property enforcement strategy,63 but is also at the top of the agenda for ongoing
60. See NIE JIANQIANG, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CHINA 130 (2006) (“[I]n developed countries, enforcement is generally left up to
private parties. That means rights holders (or organizations of right holders)
bear the expense of monitoring infringement, initiating action, and directing the
dispute resolution process.”); see also Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Foreword to
GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at ix, ix (“IPRs are private
rights and upholding them is, first and foremost, the responsibility of private
rights holders. Given that governments play an important role in ensuring the
enforcement of these private rights, the debate is . . . about how to achieve an
appropriate balance between private rights and public interest in setting and implementing IPRs enforcement standards and in allocating resources for IPRs enforcement in the face of other competing, and more immediate, public policy
priorities, particularly in developing countries.”); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 2–6 (2010) (noting that high intellectual
property enforcement standards often come with a hefty price tag and difficult
tradeoffs); cf. Gregor Urbas, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights: Interaction Between Public Authorities and Private Interests, in NEW
FRONTIERS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 303, 303 (Christopher Heath &
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2005) (“[T]he division of labour between public
and private enforcement of intellectual property not only varies considerably between countries, but is also often not clearly defined. Significant public/private
sector interaction is often required at the investigation stage for the identification
of pirated or counterfeit goods, and similarly for the collection and presentation of
appropriate evidence in any subsequent criminal prosecution.”).
61. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 962–64 (discussing the low
monetary penalties Chinese courts have awarded to rights holders).
62. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 217 (2002) [hereinafter CHOW, A
PRIMER] (“Criminal enforcement is widely recognized as the single most effective
deterrent against counterfeiting.”).
63. See USTR, 2011 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS
71 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 NTE REPORT] (noting that “weaknesses in China’s
enforcement system—criminal, civil and administrative—contribute to China’s
poor IPR enforcement record”).

R
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efforts to target internet file sharing and to develop ACTA64 and other
bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements.65
In response to the U.S. claims, China pointed out that the country
had in place a unique parallel administrative enforcement system that
“does not have a parallel in most Western systems, including the US
legal system.”66 Due to limited resources and a vastly different sociolegal tradition, public security authorities in China handle serious
cases (cases above the thresholds), while administrative copyright and
commerce authorities tackle low-scale infringements (cases below the
thresholds).67 Thus, instead of providing a safe harbor for intellectual
property criminals, Chinese law subjects “infringement on any scale”
to enforcement.68
As China informed the panel, the country “employs thresholds
across a range of commercial crimes, reflecting the significance of various illegal acts for overall public and economic order and China’s prioritization of criminal enforcement, prosecution and judicial
resources.”69 In China’s view, “the criminal thresholds for counterfeiting and piracy are reasonable and appropriate in the context of [its]
legal structure and the other laws on commercial crimes.”70 This is
64. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 18.
65. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing
free trade agreements in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell &
Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.–Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy,
2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259 (criticizing the U.S.–Australia Free Trade
Agreement); Jean-Frédéric Morin, Multilateralizing TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is
the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009) (examining the
United States’ free trade agreement strategy); Pedro Roffe et al., Intellectual
Property Rights in Free Trade Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum
Standards, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 266 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (discussing free
trade agreements in relation to the TRIPS framework); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 2, at 392–400 (discussing the growing use of bilateral, plurilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual property
standards); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 17 (critically examining the
strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements).
66. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex B–1, ¶ 9.
67. See id. ¶ 7.476.
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 7.425; see also id. annex B–1, ¶ 29 (stating that the U.S. position would
require that China “create an unworkable regime of criminal law enforcement,
and prioritize the criminal enforcement of intellectual property offenses over that
of other extremely serious crimes, such as currency counterfeiting and bribery”).
70. Id. ¶ 7.425; see also id. ¶ 7.591 (“China submits that Article 41.5 of the TRIPS
Agreement makes clear that none of the enforcement provisions can be read to
require Members to set out low-scale—and therefore high resource—thresholds
for the criminalization of intellectual property infringement. It later clarified
that low-scale thresholds implied high amounts of resources because the first
sentence of Article 61 is only satisfied by criminal measures that are actually

R
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particularly true when one considers that Chinese criminal law allows
private prosecution,71 which, China claimed, “could unleash a large
volume of private enforcement actions and impose a significant burden on the judicial system.”72 China also contended that the existing
thresholds are beneficial to rights holders, because they provide standards that are “flexible enough to capture a small number of highvalue goods or a large number of low-value goods”73—a point on which
the United States did not comment.74
In addition to justifying the need for criminal thresholds, China
explained to the panel the complexity of its criminal law. It also noted
the irony that the United States employs numerical thresholds to distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors in the area of intellectual property crimes.75 As China observed, “US authorities [in
reality] applied criminal procedures to acts associated with at least
$2,000 of infringement.”76 When asked specifically about the number
of criminal prosecutions and convictions per year the United States
had for willful trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy that involved amounts below the Chinese thresholds, the United States could
only respond, “The U.S. Department of Justice . . . does not track federal intellectual property prosecutions or convictions at a level of detail sufficient to respond to this question.”77

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.

applied.” (footnote omitted)); id. annex B–1, ¶ 31 (“It is appropriate . . . for a
Member to set thresholds that are related to the indicators of a sustainable commercial enterprise.”); id. ¶ 32 (“China has chosen its criminal thresholds not so as
to minimize its obligations under TRIPS, but because in its sovereign judgment
these thresholds best capture the points at which intellectual property infringement imperils the public order and warrants criminal enforcement.”); id. annex
B–4, ¶ 45 (“China’s 50,000 RMB (US$6,900) threshold for illegal business volume
is less than one per cent of the annual revenue of industrial enterprises that are
officially ‘small size’ and less than 25 per cent of the annual revenue of the individual or household business operation (the smallest economic unit that China
tracks).”).
See id. ¶ 7.598.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.470.
See id. ¶ 7.469.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006) (providing for criminal penalty “if the offense consists
of the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any
180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted
works, which have a total retail value of more than $2,500”); see also Harris,
supra note 46, at 155 (noting the “ten copy threshold” in U.S. law concerning
criminal copyright infringement).
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex B–4, ¶ 38.
Responses by the United States of America to the Questions by the Panel to the
Parties, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 45, WT/DS362/1 (May 5, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. Responses to the WTO Panel], available at http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_
Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Settle
ment_Listings/asset_upload_file434_14436.pdf.
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Nevertheless, U.S. practice is different from its Chinese counterpart. The former reflects mere prosecutorial discretion, as opposed to
numerical thresholds used for criminal prosecution. To some extent,
the United States’ complaint reflects its preference for prosecutorial
discretion over strict prosecutorial thresholds. As the United States
made clear, it had no objection to China’s having prosecutorial discretion.78 Nor was it challenging numerical thresholds per se.79 Taking
note of the U.S. position, the panel stated expressly that its findings
“are confined to the issue of what acts of infringement must be
criminalized and not those which must be prosecuted.”80 The panel
also recalled that it was “not asked to consider whether numerical
thresholds, as a matter of principle, can implement an obligation in
terms of cases ‘on a commercial scale.’ ”81
China further pointed out that the United States had misstated
the calculation of its thresholds. Although the United States repeatedly emphasized how counterfeiters could avoid criminal punishment
by limiting their inventory to 499 copies,82 the thresholds do not oper78. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.592 (“The United States
does not claim that China has an obligation to prosecute all counterfeiting and
piracy falling within the scope of the first sentence of Article 61.”).
79. See Responses by the United States of America to the Second Set of Questions by
the Panel to the Parties, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 2, WT/DS362/1 (July 3, 2008), available at
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Disput
e_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file294_14436.
pdf (stating that the United States does not “contend that numerical thresholds
would always be per se inconsistent with Article 61”). As the United States wrote
in its answers to the WTO panel’s first set of questions:
The United States takes issue in this dispute with China’s use of the
prices of the infringing goods to the extent that they do not permit prosecution or conviction of activity involving values of products that are below the thresholds but still “on a commercial scale.” However, the
United States does not take issue in this dispute with the use of prices of
infringing goods with respect to assessing the gravity of a crime, such as
in sentencing determinations.
U.S. Responses to the WTO Panel, supra note 77, ¶ 7.
80. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.596.
81. Id. ¶ 7.495.
82. See, e.g., id. annex A–1, ¶ 37 (“[I]f a copyright pirate makes 499 reproductions or
a retailer stocks 499 copies in a store, they could not be prosecuted or convicted
under Article 217 of the Criminal Law based on the copy threshold, because the
relevant threshold of 500 copies provided by the April 2007 [Judicial Interpretation] would not be met.”); id. annex A–2, ¶ 11 (“[T]he Article 217 500-copy threshold excludes acts of commercial scale piracy, as a copyright pirate that makes 499
reproductions or a retailer that stocks 499 copies in a store could not be prosecuted or convicted on that basis under Article 217.”); id. annex A–4, ¶ 30 (“499
unfinished copies of a video game not yet bearing an infringing trademark still
qualify as evidence of a ‘commercial scale’ operation, just as much as 499 finished
video games bearing such a trademark.”); id. annex A–6, ¶ 12 (“The reality is that
in China, a producer can make 499 copies, or a retailer can sell 499 copies, and
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ate in such a simple and rigid fashion. Nor should the panel focus on
“a single moment of infringement” or “a snapshot in time,” as opposed
to sustained criminal activities over a long period of time.83 For example, courts “may take into account multiple acts of infringement,
and not simply the income, profits, sales or number of copies in a single transaction or at a single point in time.”84 They may also calculate
the thresholds over a prolonged period of time—say, up to five years.85
In addition, even though a wide variety of thresholds exists, these
thresholds function as alternatives, and courts apply criminal procedures and penalties whenever any one of these thresholds is
satisfied.86
If that is not enough, courts take into account “evidence of collaboration between infringers,” using concepts such as joint liability, criminal groups, and accomplices as laid out in the Criminal Law.87 In
response to the U.S. claim that Chinese courts did not consider indicia
of piracy and counterfeiting,88 such as “packaging used for pirated
CDs or DVDs, fabrics used for designer products, cartridge housings
for video games, and other materials used to make counterfeit products,”89 China pointed out that its courts “consider semi-finished or
unfinished products . . . [as] evidence of preparation and attempt.”90
Chinese courts also use “materials and implements and other reliable
indicia” to determine criminal infringement.91
Finally, China reminded the WTO panel that the dispute would
“represent the first interpretation by the WTO of Articles 1.1 and 41.5
of the TRIPS.”92 Article 1.1 declares: “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”93 Article 41.5
further stipulates that a WTO member is not required to devote more

83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

escape prosecution thanks to the safe harbor created by the thresholds for Article
217.”).
Id. annex B–5, ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 7.461.
See id. ¶¶ 7.457, 7.461.
See id. ¶ 7.454 (“Satisfaction of any one of those circumstances, or ‘the amount of
illegal gains’ threshold, shall be deemed to satisfy the relevant conviction
threshold.”).
Id. ¶ 7.439; see also Chinese Criminal Law, supra note 55, arts. 25–27 (providing
for joint criminal liability and liability for criminal groups and accomplices).
See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.482.
Id. annex A–1, ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 7.483.
Id. ¶ 7.648.
Id. annex B–2, ¶ 16; see also id. ¶ 15 (“China . . . wishes to emphasize the particular contextual role of Article 1.1 and Article 41.5 of TRIPS.”).
TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1.
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resources to intellectual property enforcement than to other areas of
law enforcement.94
As China noted, both Articles 1.1 and 41.5 provided the muchneeded context for interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.95 Article 1.1,
for example, provided what China described as “a specific ‘caveat’ that
establishes boundaries on obligations, specifically in the realm of enforcement.”96 China also underscored the fact that “the balance of
rights and obligations in TRIPS is . . . very much at stake in this dispute.”97 In its first written submission, China even argued that the
United States should have a higher burden in substantiating its criminal thresholds claim before the DSB.98 As China stated, “the Panel
should treat sovereign jurisdiction over police powers as a powerful
default norm, departure from which can be authorized only in light of
explicit and unequivocal consent of State parties.”99 In later submis94. Id. art. 41.5; cf. Reichman & Lange, supra note 7, at 36 (“[F]oreign rightsholders
are merely entitled to the same legal product as their national counterparts. Because the rule of law is notoriously weak in most developing countries, and the
systemic capabilities of enforcing intellectual property rights remain especially
rudimentary in many of these countries, foreign rightsholders could experience
serious disappointments when they rely on the TRIPS enforcement procedures in
actual practice.”).
95. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.481; see also id. annex
B–2, ¶ 15 (“During the Uruguay Round negotiations, developing countries objected strenuously to new enforcement obligations that would prescribe rigid
standards and would ignore principles of sovereignty. Developing countries prevailed, over opposition from the United States and others, on the inclusion of both
Article 1.1 and Article 41.5.”).
96. Id. ¶ 7.511.
97. Id. annex B–2, ¶ 2.
98. See id. ¶ 7.497. As China explained:
In this particular instance . . . the United States bears a significantly
higher burden than it would normally encounter. That is because the
United States is advancing a claim—that Members of TRIPS must enact
criminal laws that meet highly specific international standards—that
cuts decisively against the tradition and norms of international law.
International organizations accord great deference to national authorities in criminal law matters. A review of international law shows
that states have traditionally regarded criminal law as the exclusive domain of sovereign jurisdiction; where sovereign governments are subject
to international commitments concerning criminal law, these commitments afford significant discretion to governments regarding implementation; and international courts have been exceedingly reluctant to
impose specific criminal standards on states.
In light of prevailing international law, the United States must not
merely show that its proposed interpretation of the TRIPS Article 61 obligation is correct by ordinary standards. It must also persuade this
panel that the parties to TRIPS agreed to an obligation to reform their
criminal laws of such specificity that it is a sharp departure from the
practice of every country in every other international forum that relates
to national criminal laws.
Id. annex B–1, ¶¶ 11–13.
99. Id. ¶ 7.497.
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sions, however, China backed away from such a strong sovereigntybased position. Instead, it claimed that it merely sought to assert the
“well-accepted interpretive canon in dubio mitius,”100 which the Appellate Body has expressly adopted in other disputes.101
In its report, the WTO panel began by carefully explaining why
Articles 1.1 and 41.5 do not relieve a WTO member of its obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement. As the panel declared, Article 1.1 “does
not permit differences in domestic legal systems and practices to justify any derogation from the basic obligation to give effect to the provisions on enforcement.”102 Instead of allowing a member to lower the
specified TRIPS standards, the provision merely grants to a WTO
member “freedom to determine the appropriate method of implementation of the provisions to which they are required to give effect.”103
The panel further declared that “Article 41.5 is an important provision in the overall balance of rights and obligations in Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement.”104 It nevertheless noted China’s failure to substantiate how private enforcement would overburden its criminal law
system.105 After all, China conceded that eleven out of 117 crimes
were not subject to any specific threshold.106 As the panel noted,
“whilst China may for internal policy reasons frequently use thresholds to define the point at which many classes of illegal act are considered serious enough to be criminalized, China’s legal structure is
capable of criminalizing certain acts without recourse to
thresholds.”107
100. Id. annex B–3, ¶ 4. As China elaborated:
This canon holds that when a treaty standard is vague or ambiguous the
Panel should choose the interpretation that imposes the least imposition
on a country’s sovereignty. The Panel should choose a more intrusive
interpretation only where there is clear and specific evidence that a
more intrusive interpretation was meant.
The logic behind this canon is that countries should not be assumed
lightly to concede sovereignty. The Panel accordingly must find specific
support for an interpretation that does involve an intrusive concession of
sovereignty. . . .
The international criminal law cited in China’s first written submission makes clear that this canon has particular justification in the realm
of criminal law.
Id. annex B–3, ¶¶ 4–6.
101. E.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 165 n.154, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998) (noting that in dubio mitius was an interpretive principle that had been
“widely recognized in international law” as a tool to interpret ambiguous terms).
102. Id. ¶ 7.513.
103. Id.
104. Id. ¶ 7.594.
105. See id. ¶ 7.598.
106. See id. ¶ 7.429.
107. Id.
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Notwithstanding its rejection of China’s arguments under both Articles 1.1 and 41.5, the panel “acknowledge[d] the sensitive nature of
criminal matters and attendant concerns regarding sovereignty.”108
It also recognized that “differences among Members’ respective legal
systems and practices tend to be more important in the area of enforcement.”109 In addition, the panel noted that Article 61 is subject
to four limitations: (1) trademarks and copyrights (as opposed to all
forms of intellectual property rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement); (2) counterfeiting and piracy (as opposed to mere infringement); (3) willful acts; and (4) infringements “on a commercial
scale.”110
Ultimately for the panel, the key to deciding the first claim lay in
the definition of the term “commercial scale,” which was “intentionally
vague . . . and left undefined” in the TRIPS Agreement.111 To give
meaning to this important term, the United States proposed that the
term be extended as follows:
[1] to those who engage in commercial activities in order to make a “financial
return” in the marketplace, and who are, by definition, therefore operating on
a commercial scale, as well as [2] to those whose actions, regardless of motive
or purpose, are of a sufficient extent or magnitude to qualify as “commercial
scale” in the relevant market.112

In the United States’ view, “WTO Members must criminalize acts
that reach a certain extent or magnitude; in other words, that WTO
Members must do so even where there is no evidence that the infringer has a commercial motive or purpose.”113 Among the open-ended quantitative and qualitative factors that the United States
proposed for determining whether an activity is “on a commercial
scale” are “the market for the infringed goods, the object of the infringement, the value of the infringed goods, the means of producing
the infringed goods, and the impact of the infringement on the right
holder.”114
As the United States pointed out, “[s]ome activity would be so trivial or of a de minimis character so as not to be ‘on a commercial scale’
in some circumstances, such as occasional infringing acts of a purely
personal nature carried out by consumers, or the sale of trivial
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. ¶ 7.501.
Id. ¶ 7.513.
See id. ¶¶ 7.518–.528.
Id. annex B–1, ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 7.480.
Id. annex A–1, ¶ 25.
Id. annex A–6, ¶ 8. As the United States explained: “[I]t is difficult to present an
exhaustive list of potentially relevant factors. That is because it is difficult to
identify in advance all of the circumstances under which infringers may infringe
goods, particularly given the creativity of infringers and advances in technology.”
Id. annex A–6, ¶ 9.
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volumes for trivial amounts.”115 Meanwhile, with respect to highly
expensive items such as professional software, the United States took
the view that “a single sale of an infringing product [could] qualify as
‘commercial scale.’ ”116 The United States also raised the concern that
the Internet and digital technological advancements could permit
commercial piracy and counterfeiting that creates major damage to a
market, citing the example of HDVDs (high-definition digital video
discs) which “can hold up to ten episodes of a TV series or several
films.”117
China, by contrast, proposed to limit “commercial scale” to “a significant magnitude of infringement activity,” thus providing “a broad
standard [that is] subject to national discretion and local conditions.”118 As China claimed, the U.S. approach “reads the word ‘scale’
completely out of the definition.”119
In addition to China and the United States, virtually all third parties submitted their proposed definitions of “commercial scale.”120
While these definitions varied, many of them undoubtedly had been
colored by recently signed free trade agreements, with the United
States–Australia Free Trade Agreement being a notable example.121
In the end, the panel pointed out that the term “commercial scale”
appeared in only a single provision in the entire TRIPS Agreement.122
Because the term was adopted out of “a deliberate choice,” it “must be
given due interpretative weight.”123 Using the DSB’s customary dictionary approach,124 the panel explained that the term includes both
115. Id. ¶ 7.480.
116. Id. annex A–5, ¶ 2. As the United States noted in its second oral statement:
“Could a single sale of an infringing product qualify as ‘commercial scale’ under
this interpretation? That is a question that China repeatedly raises. The answer
is that it is possible, but . . . it would depend on the circumstances . . . .” Id.
117. Id. ¶ 7.654.
118. Id. ¶ 7.481.
119. Id.
120. Id. ¶¶ 7.484–.493. The only third parties that did not submit a definition were
India and Turkey, both of which failed to either provide a written submission or
make an oral statement. See id. annex C.
121. See id. annex C–2, ¶ 11 (noting “the ordinary meaning of the word ‘commercial’
incorporates within its scope matters affecting a commercial activity in pursuit of
a financial reward”); see also United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.–Austl., art. 17.11.26(a), May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter USAFTA]
(redefining “[w]ilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale”); Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 65 (critically examining the USAFTA).
122. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.539 (noting that the term
is only found in the first and fourth sentences of Article 61).
123. Id. ¶ 7.543.
124. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION KNOWLEDGE
AGREEMENTS 95 (2d ed. 2008) (noting the “front-line use of standard dictionaries”); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 77 (2001) (“[T]he seven TRIPS dispute settlement reports
published so far have relied largely on the dictionary meaning [of the text of the
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qualitative and quantitative elements.125 As the panel reasoned:
“counterfeiting or piracy ‘on a commercial scale’ refers to counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the magnitude or extent of typical or usual
commercial activity with respect to a given product in a given
market.”126
According to the panel, the term “commercial scale” is “a relative
standard, which will vary when applied to different fact situations.”127
Because the standard “will vary by product and market,”128 it responds well to changing market conditions. As the panel reasoned:
“The specific forms of commerce are not static but adapt to changing
forms of competition due to technological development and the evolution of marketing practices.”129 The Panel saw “no reason why those
forms of commerce should be limited to the forms of commerce that
existed at the time of negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.”130 The
panel also soundly rejected the United States’ emphasis on de minimis
use:
If the negotiators had intended it to be the number of cases, they might have
been expected to phrase the provision more in terms of “other than in a very
limited number of cases” or “other than in a de minimis/insignificant number
of cases”.

125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

TRIPS Agreement].”); Gervais, China—IP Measures, supra note 32, at 552 (noting “the ‘dictionary approach’ now common in WTO panel reports”).
See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.538. As the panel
elaborated:
[T]he combination of that definition of “commercial” with the definition
of “scale” presents a problem in that scale is a quantitative concept
whilst commercial is qualitative, in the sense that it refers to the nature
of certain acts. Some acts are in fact commercial, whilst others are not.
Any act of selling can be described as commercial in this primary sense,
irrespective of its size or value. If “commercial” is simply read as a qualitative term, referring to all acts pertaining to, or bearing on commerce,
this would read the word “scale” out of the text. Acts on a commercial
scale would simply be commercial acts. The phrase “on a commercial
scale” would simply mean “commercial”. Such an interpretation fails to
give meaning to all the terms used in the treaty and is inconsistent with
the rule of effective treaty interpretation.
There are no other uses of the word “scale” in the TRIPS Agreement,
besides the first and fourth sentences of Article 61. However, the wider
context shows that the TRIPS Agreement frequently uses the word “commercial” with many other nouns, although nowhere else with “scale”.
The other uses of the word “commercial” include “commercial rental,”
“commercial purposes,” “commercial exploitation,” “commercial terms,”
“public non-commercial use,” “first commercial exploitation,” “honest
commercial practices,” “commercial value,” “unfair commercial use,”
“non-commercial nature,” and “legitimate commercial interests”.
Id. ¶¶ 7.538–.539 (footnotes omitted).
Id. ¶ 7.577.
Id. ¶ 7.600.
Id. ¶ 7.604.
Id. ¶ 7.657 (footnote omitted).
Id.
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....
. . . Had the negotiators wanted to exclude only de minimis infringement from
the minimum standard of Article 61, they had a model in Article 60, or they
could have used words such as “except for minor or personal use”. However,
they did not. Instead, Article 61 refers to size (“scale”) qualified only by the
word “commercial”. This indicates that the negotiators intended something
different from de minimis.131

To assess the consistency of China’s criminal thresholds with this
complex definition, the WTO panel looked to specific conditions in
China’s marketplace.132 These conditions have been complicated by
the fact that “the Chinese market, including the market for many copyright and trademark-bearing goods, is fragmented and characterized
by a profusion of small manufacturers, middlemen, distributors, and
small outlets at the retail level.”133 To some extent, the drafters of the
TRIPS Agreement might not have this type of highly fragmented markets in mind when they adopted the provision.
Although the United States provided evidence in the form of press
articles and industry and consultant reports,134 the panel found the
evidence insufficient to “demonstrate what constituted ‘a commercial
scale’ in the specific situation of China’s marketplace.”135 As the
panel explained, the information the United States provided was “too
little and too random.”136 Even though the submitted press articles
were drawn from well-established and well-regarded sources, they
131. Id. ¶¶ 7.387, 7.553 (footnote omitted).
132. See id. ¶ 7.604 (“The parties agree that the standard of ‘a commercial scale’ will
vary by product and market and that the conformity of China’s criminal thresholds with that standard must be assessed by reference to China’s marketplace.”).
133. Id. ¶ 7.615; see also U.S. Responses to the WTO Panel, supra note 77, ¶ 41 n.20
(quoting A.T. KEARNEY, 2005 GLOBAL RETAIL DEVELOPMENT INDEX: DESTINATION
CHINA 2 (2005), available at http://www.atkearney.com/images/global/pdf/GRDI_
2005_China.pdf) (“[A]lthough the Chinese retail market is huge, it is extremely
fragmented, with no dominant organized players. The top 10 retailers hold less
than 2 percent of the market, and the top 100 retailers have less than 6.4 percent.”). As the United States elaborated in its first written submission:
[A] single wholesale mall in Yiwu, China houses some 30,000 stores,
many of them in small 10-by-15 foot stalls. Retail establishments come
in many different sizes and are widely dispersed across China. Another
shopping mall in Luohu Commercial City spans six floors of small stores
and offers “counterfeit goods at bargain prices.” In spite of the recent
growth of large retailers in China, much retail commerce appears to still
be conducted through small outlets, and consequently beyond the reach
of criminal sanctions due to the criminal thresholds.
First Submission of the United States, China—Measures Affecting the Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights ¶ 122, WT/DS362/1 (Jan. 30,
2008) (footnote omitted), available at http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Agree
ments/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Settlement_
Listings/asset_upload_file605_14436.pdf.
134. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶¶ 7.615–.616.
135. Id. ¶ 7.614.
136. Id. ¶ 7.617.
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“[were] printed in US or other foreign English-language media that
are not claimed to be authoritative sources of information on prices
and markets in China.”137 They were also uncorroborated and did not
“refer to events or statements that would not require corroboration.”138 Given the sources’ lack of authority, the panel did not
“ascribe any weight to the evidence in the press articles and [found]
that, even if it did, the information that these press articles contain is
inadequate to demonstrate what is typical or usual in China for the
purposes of the relevant treaty obligation.”139
In sum, without determining whether China had satisfied its
TRIPS obligations, the WTO panel found that the United States had
failed to substantiate its claim. China therefore prevailed on what
many have considered the most important claim in the dispute.
B.

Disposal of Infringing Goods

The second claim concerned the ability of the Chinese customs authorities to properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the border.
Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Without prejudice to other rights of action open to the right holder and
subject to the right of the defendant to seek review by a judicial authority,
competent authorities shall have the authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods in accordance with the principles set out in Article
46.140

Article 46 states further:
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have found to
be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the
channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the
right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed.141

Taken together, these two provisions require a WTO member to
empower its judicial authorities to order the uncompensated destruction or disposal of infringing goods seized at the border. Because these
provisions only lay out an empowerment obligation, as compared to
mandating a specific action, the WTO member is not required to “exercise [the stipulated] authority in a particular way, unless otherwise
specified.”142 Instead, the authorities retain a high degree of discre137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. ¶ 7.628.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.629.
TRIPS Agreement art. 59.
Id. art. 46.
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.238. As the panel recounted,
“Previous drafts of the TRIPS Agreement had provided that the authorities shall
‘provide for’ certain remedies, but this phrasing was changed to read shall ‘have
the authority’, as were a number of other draft provisions.” Id.
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tion to determine their preferred actions. As China contended, “[t]he
obligation in Article 59 to grant ‘authority’ to order destruction does
not mean that Members must make a grant of unfettered and unguided discretion and that domestic agencies must have the absolute
power to order destruction of infringing goods in any circumstance
whatsoever.”143
Indeed, in many less developed countries, such destruction “may
lead to significant economic waste and be socially questionable.”144
The push for destruction, therefore, may be inconsistent with the objective of sustainable development as stated in the first recital of the
preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.145 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan has gone even further
to argue that the WTO should use this overarching objective to reconcile the different economic, social, and environmental interests within
the WTO framework.146
Moreover, the destruction option in Article 46 is subject to constitutional constraints, which vary from member to member. The current language includes the phrase “unless this would be contrary to
existing constitutional requirements” before the word “destroyed.”147
According to Daniel Gervais, this particular phrase “was introduced to
reflect a rule in countries such as Brazil where destruction of otherwise useful goods is allegedly unconstitutional.”148
In light of the limited obligation in Article 59, the United States
could not argue that the Chinese customs authorities had failed to destroy infringing goods seized at the border—the action the U.S. administration and its supportive rights holders preferred. Instead, the
United States advanced a much weaker, and rather academic, argument that China introduced a “compulsory scheme” that took away
the authorities’ “scope of authority to order the destruction or disposal
of infringing goods.”149 Article 27 of the Regulations on Customs Pro143. Id. ¶ 7.198; see also CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 423 (2007)
(“[T]he ‘judicial authorities shall have the authority’ formulation leaves Members
broad room to determine how that objective will be reached.”).
144. TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 595.
145. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., recital
1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 154.
146. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO
Law (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law, Research
Paper No. 08–02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309526 (suggesting the use of “the WTO-overarching objective of sustainable development as
a principle for reconciling economic, social and environmental interests which applies to all WTO Agreements,” including the TRIPS Agreement).
147. TRIPS Agreement art. 46.
148. Daniel Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full TRIPS
Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2353, 2354 n.5 (2009).
149. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.197.

R
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tection of Intellectual Property Rights (Customs Regulations)
provided:
Where the confiscated goods infringing an intellectual property right can
be used for public welfare projects, the Customs shall hand such goods over to
the relevant public welfare bodies for use in public welfare projects; where the
holder of the intellectual property right intends to purchase the goods, the
Customs may have such goods assigned to the holder of the intellectual property right with compensation. Where either the confiscated goods infringing
an intellectual property right cannot be used for public welfare project or the
holder of the intellectual property right has no intention to purchase the
goods, the Customs may have such goods auctioned according to law after removing their infringing features; where the infringing features cannot be removed, the Customs shall destroy the goods.150

As the United States argued, this provision, in conjunction with the
relevant implementing measures and a public notice from the customs
authorities, created a “compulsory scheme” that has taken away the
ability of the authorities to exercise their discretion.151 This scheme
precluded the authorities from destroying the infringing goods unless
they found it inappropriate to donate the goods to charities, sell them
back to rights holders, or auction them off after eradicating the infringing features.
In response to the U.S. claims, China pointed out that the sequence
merely expressed “an official preference” for disposition methods.152
Under this flexible arrangement, China claimed, its customs authorities still had wide discretion to determine whether the stated criteria
had been met. As the panel recognized, there were “circumstances in
which Customs depart[ed] from the terms of the measures,”153 and
the measures were “not ‘as mandatory’ as they appear[ed] on their
face.”154 China further reminded the panel that “[t]he United States
affords its own Customs only conditioned authority . . . [but] has provided the Panel no arguments as to why its favored form of conditioning is appropriate, but China’s sequencing guidelines are not.”155
To the surprise of the United States and many intellectual property rights holders, the WTO panel began by praising China for providing “a level of protection higher than the minimum standard
required” by the TRIPS Agreement.156 For example, China has extended border measures not only to piracy and counterfeiting, but also
150. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (
) (promulgated by the
State Council, Nov. 26, 2003, effective Mar. 1, 2004), art. 27, http://english.cust
oms.gov.cn/publish/portal191/tab43987/info298867.htm.
151. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.197.
152. Id. ¶ 7.198.
153. Id. ¶ 7.348.
154. Id.
155. Id. annex B–5, ¶ 20.
156. Id. ¶ 7.228.
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to other forms of copyright, patent, and trademark infringements.157
Thanks to U.S. pressure in the early-to-mid-1990s158 and with strong
influence from the European Union,159 these border measures have
been further extended to both imported and exported goods even
though Article 59 covers only imported goods.160 In fact, unlike those
in other countries, the Chinese customs authorities have given “disproportionate weight to export monitoring.”161 “[While] most countries use Customs to protect themselves from the inflow of
counterfeits[,] . . . China has used its Customs resources chiefly to protect other countries, by stopping the exportation of counterfeits.”162
Thus, it is understandable why Chinese officials were rather frustrated with this second claim. As Vice Premier Wu Yi declared: “The
Chinese government is extremely dissatisfied about [the WTO dispute
over TRIPS enforcement], but we will proactively respond according to
the related WTO rules and see it through to the end.”163
With respect to donations and sales to rights holders, the WTO
panel noted that Article 59 “do[es] not indicate that the authority to
order the specified types of remedies must be exclusive.”164 While donations may help meet public welfare needs and are suitable to conditions in less developed countries,165 sales to rights holders can be
justified by the fact that some rights holders may want to purchase
unauthorized overruns that are qualitatively identical to the author157. See id. ¶ 7.226 (“It is apparent that the intellectual property right infringements
covered by the Customs measures include not only counterfeit trademark goods
and pirated copyright goods, but certain other infringements of intellectual property rights, namely other trademark-infringing goods, other copyright-infringing
goods, and patent-infringing goods.”).
158. See Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, U.S.–China, § 1[G], Feb. 26, 1995, Agreement Regarding Intellectual
Property Rights, Annex, 34 I.L.M. 881, 900–03 (1995) (requiring all Chinese customs offices to intensify border protection for all imports and exports of CDs, LDs,
CD-ROMS, and trademarked goods).
159. See Xue, supra note 46, at 298 (noting that “Chinese Regulations on Customs
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights follows Regulation 1383/2003 on customs actions against goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights”).
160. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.227.
161. MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 79 (2009).
162. Id.
163. Wu: US Piracy Case Will Harm Trade Ties, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 24, 2007, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/24/content_858638.htm.
164. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.240.
165. See id. ¶ 7.306 (“In one case, Customs donated infringing goods to the Red Cross
that were allocated to people in areas struck by natural disasters such as typhoons, rainstorms and floods. The goods all infringed trademark rights and consisted of sport shoes, bags of rice noodles, washing powder, air-cooled chillers and
kerosene heaters.”).
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ized manufactures.166 The panel even accepted the use of auctions to
dispose of infringing goods. As it explained, because “the remedies
specified in Article 59 are not exhaustive . . . , the fact that authority
to order auction of infringing goods is not required is not in itself inconsistent with Article 59.”167
Nevertheless, the panel faulted China for the way its customs authorities auctioned off the seized goods. As clearly stated in Article 46
of the TRIPS Agreement—the provision that provides the principles
incorporated into Article 59—“[i]n regard to counterfeit trademark
goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall
not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit release of
the goods into the channels of commerce.”168 Whether the removal is
considered “simple” will depend on whether “the state of the goods is
altered sufficiently to deter further infringement.”169 The panel did
not indicate what exactly needs to be done to avoid a violation of Article 59. It merely hinted that an exceptional case may arise when “an
innocent importer . . . has been deceived into buying a shipment of
counterfeit goods, . . . has no means of recourse against the exporter
and . . . has no means of reaffixing counterfeit trademarks to the
goods.”170 It also suggested that “[p]ractical requirements, such as removal of the trademark, affixation of a charitable endorsement or controls over the use of goods or distribution methods, may avoid
confusion.”171
Although China provided additional measures, such as the solicitation of comments from rights holders172 and the introduction of an
166. See id. annex B–1, ¶ 38 (“Right-holders may choose to purchase infringing goods
where, for example, these seized goods are determined to be overruns illicitly produced by a licensed manufacturer, and are therefore identical to the licensed
goods.”). But see id. annex A–1, ¶ 52 (“[A]nyone who has to pay for goods that
violates his or her own patent, trademark or copyright is harmed in the amount
of the payment.”).
167. Id. ¶ 7.327.
168. TRIPS Agreement art. 46.
169. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.375. As Professor Gervais
explained:
If simple removal of the mark is allowed, the (probably professional) infringer takes very little chance: he just waits for the next shipment of
infringing logos, etc. and starts again. The major cost is the item to
which a logo or fake label is applied. This is why the provision requires
safe disposal of the item and often its destruction.
GERVAIS, supra note 2, at 457.
170. Id. ¶ 7.391.
171. Id. ¶ 7.284.
172. See id. annex B–1, ¶ 47 (“[R]ight-holders have a legal, formal right to comment
prior to any public auction; this procedure helps Customs to determine that a
good would be inappropriate for public auction, and thereby helps avoid harm to
the right-holders.”); id. annex B–1, ¶ 53 (“Formal comment . . . allows right-holders to identify specific concerns—such as any safety threats that the goods pose,
or the presence of proprietary design features that cannot be removed—and al-

R
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expertly-determined reserve price,173 those measures, in the panel’s
view, did not “create an effective deterrent to infringement”—a key
objective of Article 46.174 As the panel noted with respect to the reserve price:
[I]t remains economically viable for the importer or a third party to purchase
the goods at auction and reaffix the trademarks in order to infringe again . . . .
In any case, there is no evidence that the prices established by the method
used by China Customs are so high that it is no longer economically viable to
purchase the goods and reaffix the trademarks.175

Likewise, even though a small amount of the seized goods—only
0.87 percent by the number of shipments or 2.2 percent by the value of
the seized goods—are subject to auctions,176 the panel found that the
provision was not “narrowly circumscribed” enough to be covered
within the “exceptional cases” permissible under the TRIPS Agreement.177 As the panel noted further, “[e]ven when [the provision was]
narrowly circumscribed, application of the relevant provision must be
rare, lest the so-called exception become the rule, or at least
ordinary.”178
In the end, China lost part of the second claim, even though the
panel upheld as TRIPS-consistent the use of donations, sales to rights
holders, and auctions. The panel also rejected the U.S. claim that customs actions in China were subject to “a compulsory sequence of steps”
in violation of the TRIPS Agreement.

173.

174.
175.
176.
177.

178.

lows Customs to determine that an auction would not be appropriate.”). But see
id. annex A–2, ¶ 23 (noting that the right to comment “is not a right to prevent
the goods from being auctioned”).
See id. ¶ 7.202 (noting that China Customs “uses a reserve price at auction to
ensure that infringers do not have the opportunity to purchase the seized goods
at an unreasonably low cost and reaffix counterfeit marks”). Article 18 of the
Measures on Administration of Property Confiscated by Customs states:
A reserve price shall be set for the confiscated property authorized to be
auctioned off. Should appraisal be required in accordance with relevant
provisions of laws and regulations, a price assessment entity lawfully
established shall be authorized to complete such appraisal. In the case
that several auction enterprises bid for the right to auction, the bid
prices shall be compared with the appraisal price and the highest one
taken as the reserve price. In the case that there were no multiple bids
for the right to auction, the reserve price shall be reasonably determined
based on the appraisal price given by the price assessment entity.
Id. ¶ 7.382 n.361.
Id. ¶ 7.373.
Id. ¶ 7.382.
See id. ¶ 7.349.
Id. ¶ 7.391–.393; see also id. ¶ 7.392 (noting that the phrase “exceptional cases”
within the meaning of the TRIPS Agreement “is not assessed in terms of a proportion of all cases of infringing goods seized at the border”).
Id. ¶ 7.391.
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Copyright Protection for Censored Works

The final claim in the dispute concerned the first sentence of Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law, which states that “[w]orks the
publication and/or dissemination of which are prohibited by law shall
not be protected by this Law.”179 Under the statute, works can be
banned by “Criminal Law, the Regulations on the Administration of
Publishing Industry, the Regulations on the Administration of Broadcasting, the Regulations on the Administration of Audiovisual Products, the Regulations on the Administration of Films, and the
Regulations on the Administration of Telecommunication.”180 Based
on China’s denial of protection to banned works, the United States
claimed that China had failed to offer protection to copyright holders
as required by the Berne Convention, which was incorporated by reference in Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.181 Article 5(1) of the
Berne Convention states:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under
this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the
rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.182
179. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (
)
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990,
amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001), art. 4, http://www.wipo.int/wipo
lex/en/text.jsp?file_id=125980 [hereinafter Chinese Copyright Law]. In lieu of
“and/or,” the conjunctive was used in the official English translation of the Chinese Copyright Law. In the WTO panel report, however, the phrase “and/or” was
used in Mutually Agreed Translation No. 11. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report,
supra note 9, ¶ 7.1.
180. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.73. For example, the Regulations on the Administration of Films, the Regulations on the Administration of
Audiovisual Products, and the Regulations on the Administration of Publications
prohibited the publication and distribution of ten identical categories of content
that:
(1) are against the fundamental principles established in the
Constitution;
(2) jeopardize the unification, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State;
(3) divulge State secrets, jeopardize security of the State, or impair the
prestige and interests of the State;
(4) incite hatred and discrimination among ethnic groups, harm their
unity, or violate their customs and habits;
(5) propagate cults and superstition;
(6) disrupt public order and undermine social stability;
(7) propagate obscenity, gambling, or violence, or abet to commit crimes;
(8) insult or slander others, or infringe upon legitimate rights and interests of others;
(9) jeopardize social ethics or fine national cultural traditions; [and]
(10) other contents banned by laws, administrative regulations and provisions of the State.
Id. ¶ 7.79.
181. TRIPS Agreement art. 9.1.
182. Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(1).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB412.txt

1076

unknown

Seq: 31

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

2-AUG-11

15:24

[Vol. 89:1046

Article 5(2) further provides: “The enjoyment and the exercise of
these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and
such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the
country of origin of the work.”183 By denying copyright holders the
immediate and automatic enjoyment of their rights, and by subjecting
copyright to the formalities of a successful conclusion of content review, the Chinese Copyright Law, in the United States’ view, contravened the Berne Convention.184
The United States’ demand for greater copyright protection in
banned works is highly interesting in light of its constant and heavy
criticism of the censorship and information control policy in China.185
It is, indeed, ironic and somewhat self-defeating for the United States
to claim that greater copyright protection is needed to compensate for
the ineffectiveness of China’s censorship policy when U.S. foreign policy actively and frequently paints a rather gloomy picture of heavy
and effective censorship in China.
Nevertheless, the interests of the U.S. administration and rights
holders in pushing for greater private copyright enforcement may be
attributed to several causes. First, conscious of the negative implications of censorship for the protection of human rights and civil liberties, the U.S. administration and rights holders may be reluctant to
use the censorship process to crack down on the release of infringing
materials. Second, there may be a difference between works that are
not yet approved and works that are prohibited. While the censorship
and public security authorities actively remove the latter from public
dissemination, they are less concerned about the former. Third, the
remedies between public and private enforcement may be different.
For example, courts, as opposed to administrative agencies, can grant
damage compensation and pre-litigation remedies to those prevailing
in copyright lawsuits.186 Fourth, the U.S. administration and rights
holders may be concerned about the potential exportation of infringing
works to other potential markets. While exportation is less likely for
written materials and customized software—which are usually in Chinese—understandable concerns exist with respect to music and movies (Chinese subtitles notwithstanding).
In addition to claims under the Berne Convention, the United
States also raised arguments based on Article 41.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which states: “Members shall ensure that enforcement
183. Id. art. 5(2).
184. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex A–1, ¶¶ 57–58.
185. See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom, Address Delivered at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (criticizing
internet censorship in China).
186. See PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA
290 (2005).
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procedures . . . are available under their law so as to permit effective
action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights
covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements.”187 According to the United States, Chinese law did
not provide any effective action against infringement of those copyrighted works that had not passed the content review process or that
were awaiting the results of the review.
In response to the U.S. claims, China made a number of counterarguments. First, China claimed that the first sentence of Article 4 of
the Copyright Law was “extremely limited in scope.”188 Like other
countries, China bans from publication or dissemination works that
consist entirely of unconstitutional or immoral content.189 With respect to works that had been edited to pass content review, however,
the law protected “copyright in the edited version of the work, including against copies of the unedited version that infringed copyright in
the edited, approved version.”190 It also protected works that had yet
to be subject to content review or that were awaiting the results of the
review.191 The law only failed to protect the “unedited, prohibited
copies of an unedited, prohibited work that failed content review.”192
A case in point was Shrek 2, the copyright of which was protected
even though the film itself had not completed the content review process.193 As the panel observed, “administrative penalty documents
citing Article 47 of the Copyright Law and Article 36 of the Copyright
Implementing Regulations were issued in September 2004 to one audio-visual shop in Xiamen relating to the distribution of unauthorized
DVD copies of Shrek 2.”194 To some extent, the U.S. claim in this area
seemed to have been greatly weakened by the ad hoc “special actions”
the U.S. administration and its supportive rights holders had elicited
from China through constant pressure under the section 301 process,
meetings with the U.S.–China Joint Committee on Commerce and
Trade (“JCCT”), and other formal and informal mechanisms. Faced
with this pressure and in response to a request made by the Motion
Picture Association of America, China, in November 2001, adopted
National Copyright Administration Circular No. 55, which “set up procedures to protect 700 US films, without inquiry as to whether the
187. TRIPS Agreement art. 41.1.
188. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.17.
189. See id. ¶ 7.78. Such a ban also included “reactionary, pornographic, or superstitious contents.” Id. ¶ 7.54.
190. Id. ¶ 7.19.
191. See id. ¶ 7.99.
192. Id. ¶ 7.20.
193. See id. annex B–5, ¶ 34.
194. Id. ¶ 7.99.
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films were edited to pass content review.”195 Ironically, this circular
and the resulting pre-release enforcement now serve as evidence to
show that films that have yet to complete content review can still receive copyright protection.
In addition, China distinguished a denial of the authority to publish from a denial of copyright,196 perhaps out of concern that copyright holders would insist on the positive right to publish regardless of
whether their works have been censored. Making a weak, and rather
bizarre, distinction between “copyright” and “copyright protection,”
China contended that Article 4 did not remove copyright, but denied
the “particularized rights of private copyright enforcement.”197 According to China, authors would still have “access” to the enforcement
process even if they did not have adequate evidence or a valid right to
enforce198—a point that seems to have been influenced by United
States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, which “requires [WTO] Members to make certain civil judicial procedures
‘available’ to right holders.”199
China further insisted that Article 17 of the Berne Convention recognize a country’s sovereign right “to permit, to control, or to prohibit
. . . the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or production.”200 In China’s view, Article 17 partially codified a country’s “sovereign right to censor.”201 The provision therefore places limitations
on all rights granted to authors under the Berne Convention. As
195. Id. annex B–5, ¶ 36. As the panel pointed out:

196.
197.
198.

199.

200.
201.

[The circular was] issued in November 2001 to subsidiary copyright
bureaux in order to enhance enforcement actions against a list of 788
foreign cinematographic works in response to a request from the Motion
Picture Association of America. The introductory paragraph of the Circular indicates that this was also a special action. The Circular included
works without enquiry as to whether they had all been edited to pass
content review and . . . it applied inter alia to pirated DVDs coded for
zones outside China, which may include unedited versions not approved
during content review.
Id. ¶ 7.100.
See id. ¶ 7.17.
Id. ¶ 7.21.
See id. ¶ 7.178 (“China asserts that the enforcement procedures in Chapter V of
the Copyright Law are ‘available’ in the sense that the authors of all works have
‘access’ to enforcement process irrespective of whether they have adequate evidence or a valid right to enforce.”).
Section 211 Appellate Body Report, supra note 10, ¶ 215 (“The first sentence of
Article 42 requires Members to make certain civil judicial procedures ‘available’
to right holders. Making something available means making it ‘obtainable’, putting it ‘within one’s reach’ and ‘at one’s disposal’ in a way that has sufficient force
or efficacy.”).
Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 17.
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.120.
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China observed, Article 17 was “drafted using very expansive language ‘that effectively denies WTO jurisdiction in this area.’ ”202
Finally, China pointed out that public regulations a priori preempt
private economic rights. Because the copyright in banned works was
considered a “legal and material nullity,” enforcement of such a right
would be meaningless.203 China also stated that it “enforces prohibitions on content seriously, and . . . this removes banned content from
the public domain more securely than would be possible through copyright enforcement.”204 Because the ban applies to both copyright
holders and potential infringers, private enforcement is unnecessary.205 In China’s view, content regulatory measures have already
provided “an alternative form of enforcement against infringement.”206 The country has therefore complied with the “effective action” obligation under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.207
Despite this long list of defenses and counterclaims China had advanced, the WTO panel found Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law
to be inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the panel
rejected China’s distinction between copyright and copyright protection, pointing out that such a distinction would render copyright “no
more than a phantom right.”208 The panel also noted that the enforcement procedures under Article 41.1 are “far more extensive” than
mere access to the enforcement process.209 In addition, the panel
noted that, even though China had made a policy choice to make available other enforcement procedures, such as content regulatory measures, that particular choice “[did] not diminish the member’s
obligation under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.”210
To the major disappointment of human rights advocates, the panel
openly recognized a country’s sovereign right to prohibit the publica202. Id.
203. Id. ¶ 7.134; see also id. annex B–4, ¶ 103 (“When governments exercise their sovereign power to censor, the exercise of private rights is moot: unauthorized copying is not permitted. Copyright continues, but enforcement is not needed: the
content is banned.”).
204. Id. ¶ 7.137.
205. See id.
206. Id. ¶ 7.180.
207. See TRIPS Agreement art. 41.1 (“Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered
by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”).
208. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.67; see also id. ¶ 7.66 (“It is
difficult to conceive that copyright would continue to exist, undisturbed, after the
competent authorities had denied copyright protection to a work on the basis of
the nature of the work and the prohibition in the Copyright Law itself.”).
209. Id. ¶ 7.179.
210. Id. ¶ 7.180.
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tion or distribution of those works.211 As the panel reasoned, “copyright and government censorship address different rights and
interests.”212 While copyright protects private rights, government
censorship addresses public interests.213 Censorship regulations, according to the panel, therefore cannot eliminate rights that are inherent in a copyrighted work.214 The panel also noted China’s failure to
“explain why censorship interferes with copyright owners’ rights to
prevent third parties from exploiting prohibited works.”215
Throughout its report, the WTO panel seemed rather reluctant to
take “judicial notice” of censorship in China, even though China’s efforts to ban immoral and politically-sensitive works are well-known
and have been widely documented.216 Instead, the panel expected
China to substantiate its assertion that rights holders will obtain
greater protection through censorship regulations than copyright
law.217 Likewise, it is amusing that the United States opted for the
term “content regulation” in lieu of “censorship,” while China frankly
admitted censorship within the country and pushed hard for the rec211. See, e.g., Tomer Broude, It’s Easily Done: The China—Intellectual Property
Rights Enforcement Dispute and the Freedom of Expression, 13 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 660, 661 (2010) (arguing that “contrary to any prior expectations of spontaneous confluence between trade, intellectual property and human rights, the reasoning of [this panel report] is entirely oblivious to the human rights implications
of the dispute, and that it could even have negative effects on the legal framework
of the freedom of expression in China”).
212. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.135.
213. See id.
214. As the panel stated:
A government’s right to permit, to control, or to prohibit the circulation,
presentation, or exhibition of a work may interfere with the exercise of
certain rights with respect to a protected work by the copyright owner or
a third party authorized by the copyright owner. However, there is no
reason to suppose that censorship will eliminate those rights entirely
with respect to a particular work.
Id. ¶ 7.132.
215. Id. ¶ 7.133.
216. The panel’s approach contrasts strongly with the preference of some U.S. policymakers. See, e.g., U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 73 (remarks of Commissioner Patrick Mulloy) (“Maybe [the United States] could ask the court at the
WTO to take judicial notice because sometimes you can ask a court to do that,
and based on what the WTO itself has said about China, I don’t understand why
there is this enormous rock to lift up this hill when everybody knows and will say
it’s going on.”).
217. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.137 (“China maintains
that public censorship renders private enforcement unnecessary, that it enforces
prohibitions on content seriously, and that this removes banned content from the
public domain more securely than would be possible through copyright enforcement. The Panel notes that these assertions, even if they were relevant, are not
substantiated.” (footnote omitted)).
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ognition of its “sovereign right to censor.”218 To a large extent, the
different word choice and posture suggest the very different views
held by China and the United States over the appropriateness of using
censorship to maintain public order and social stability.
Finally, in the interest of judicial economy, the panel did not address the claims under Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, the outcomes of which, the panel
claimed, are likely to be similar to those of the decided claims.219 Although the panel confirmed that its conclusion would not apply to
works never submitted for or awaiting the results of content review in
China as well as the unedited version of works for which an edited
version has been approved for distribution,220 it recognized the “uncertainty” created by the potential denial in the absence of a determination by the censorship authorities.221 The United States therefore
won the third claim decisively.
III. THE LIMITATIONS (AND PERHAPS MISTAKES)
Immediately following the release of the WTO panel report, both
China and the United States quickly declared victory. As Acting
USTR Peter Allgeier maintained:
These findings are an important victory, because they confirm the importance
of IPR protection and enforcement, and clarify key enforcement provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement. Having achieved this significant legal ruling, we will
218. Id. ¶ 7.121; see also Broude, supra note 211, at 661 (“[T]he panel much preferred
to use the somewhat euphemistic term ‘content review’, which was used literally
100 times in the report in comparison with only nine times that the ‘explicit
name’ of censorship was used—the latter usually on the basis of the submissions
made by the Chinese government itself.”).
219. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶¶ 7.145–.153, 7.182–.185.
220. See id. ¶ 7.103 (considering that “the United States has not made a prima facie
case with respect to works never submitted for content review in China, works
awaiting the results of content review in China and the unedited versions of
works for which an edited version has been approved for distribution in China”).
221. As the panel declared:
[T]he Panel recognizes that the potential denial of copyright protection,
in the absence of a determination by the content review authorities, implies uncertainty with respect to works that do not satisfy the content
criteria prior to a determination under Article 4(1) of the Copyright Law,
with the consequent impact on enjoyment of rights described above.
Therefore, the Panel reiterates for the record the firm position of China
taken in these proceedings that:
“Copyright vests at the time that a work is created, and is not contingent on publication. Unpublished works are protected, foreign works not
yet released in the Chinese market are protected, and works never released in the Chinese market are protected.”; and
“Works that are unreviewed are decidedly not ‘prohibited by law’.”
Id. ¶ 7.118 (footnote omitted).
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engage vigorously with China on appropriate corrective actions to ensure that
US rights holders obtain the benefits of this decision.222

The response by Yao Jian, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce, by contrast, was more subdued. Although he “welcomed”
the verdict on criminal thresholds, he expressed “regret” about the unfavorable aspects of the ruling and maintained that his government
was “making a further assessment of the Dispute Settlement Body
panel report.”223
Given the fact that either party can interpret the dispute’s outcome
as a 2–1 victory, it is rather difficult to determine which statement is
the more correct. Nevertheless, academic commentators seem to have
aligned themselves with China’s assessment. Michael Geist, for example, noted: “The U.S. did not win this case, but rather lost
badly.”224 Frederick Abbott added, “It was foreseeable that WTO dispute settlement would be a problematic way for the United States to
accomplish the enforcement objectives its industry groups laid out.
There is doubtless some value that everybody thought about TRIPS
enforcement rules a bit.”225 Xue Hong noted further, “If the WTO rulings are substantially sided with the United States’ claims against
China’s intellectual property enforcement, it is surprising that China
is seemingly calm and quiet in such a serious situation.”226
Although it is tempting to declare winners and losers in a legal
dispute, and government spokespeople often use their best efforts to
capture the bright side of even the most undesirable outcomes, WTO
panel reports do not lend themselves to victory proclamations. In fact,
by “cutting the baby in half,” the WTO panel successfully avoided
picking a winner and a loser in this dispute. It is therefore no surprise
that neither the United States nor China appealed the report to the
Appellate Body. This outcome serves as an interesting contrast to the
outcome of the U.S.–China market access dispute, which was quickly
appealed by both parties.227
222. Press Release, USTR, United States Wins WTO Dispute Over Deficiencies in
China’s Intellectual Property Rights Laws (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/january/united-states-wins-wto-dispute
-over-deficiencies-c.
223. Ruling in US–China Piracy Dispute Raises Controversy, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., Jan. 28, 2009, at 7 [hereinafter Ruling in US–China Piracy Dispute].
224. Michael Geist, Why the U.S. Lost Its WTO IP Complaint Against China. Badly,
MICHAEL GEIST’S BLOG (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/
3645/125/; see also Rogier Creemers, The Effects of World Trade Organisation
Case DS362 on Audiovisual Media Piracy in China, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
568, 575 (2009) (noting that “subsequent commentaries denoted the victory as
being ‘hollow’, or ‘totally meaningless’ ”).
225. Ruling in US–China Piracy Dispute, supra note 223, at 9.
226. Xue, supra note 46, at 292.
227. See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Prod-
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In retrospect, the outcome of this dispute is actually not hard to
predict, notwithstanding the many inherent ambiguities built into the
TRIPS Agreement.228 A number of commentators have already gone
on record to observe an even match between the two parties.229 In
past academic events, I also noted that China would prevail on the
criminal threshold claim, while the United States would win the formalities claim, with the second one being a toss-up, due to its factintensive nature.230
While these predictions were not too far off, the importance of the
WTO panel report is not in its conclusions, but rather in the reasoning
behind those conclusions. For intellectual property rights holders, the
most important question is not who wins or loses in the dispute, but
whether the resolution of this dispute would lead to substantive improvements in intellectual property protection and enforcement in
China. The answer, unfortunately, is mostly negative.
A.

Thresholds for Criminal Procedures and Penalties

The first claim concerned the thresholds for criminal procedures
and penalties. Because the United States failed to provide sufficient
evidence to substantiate this claim, the thresholds in the Chinese
Criminal Law remain intact. To some extent, the panel report showed
how complex Chinese criminal laws are. The various submissions and
oral statements also suggested that the U.S. position might have been
hurt by the ongoing perpetuation of Western stereotypes about the
shortcomings of the Chinese legal system—just like how these stereotypes have sometimes hurt foreign businesspeople in China.
ucts, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Market Access Appellate Body
Report].
228. See WATAL, supra note 124, at 7 (advancing the concept of “constructive ambiguities”); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1022–23 (2009) (discussing the ambiguities within the TRIPS
Agreement).
229. See, e.g., U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 226 (testimony of Daniel C.K. Chow,
Professor of Law, Ohio State University) (noting that it was not “a clear-cut case
that China [was] in violation of the WTO”); Harris, supra note 46, at 187 (“[T]he
complaint will result in very little substantive intellectual property changes. The
United States may prevail on some of its claims, but China should be able to
successfully defend on the primary claim.”); Liza Porteus Viana, Industry Losing
Faith in WIPO; Debates US WTO Cases Against China, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/03/28/industry-losingfaith-in-wipo-debates-us-wto-cases-against-china/ (reporting about the debate on
“whether the piracy complaints lodged against China at the World Trade Organization are going to be effective in compelling Beijing to enforce anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy measures”).
230. I made these predictions during my Distinguished Professor Presentation at John
Marshall Law School in Chicago on November 6, 2007 and at the 16th Fordham
Annual International Intellectual Property and Policy Conference at Fordham
University School of Law in New York on March 28, 2008.

R
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If one has to challenge Chinese law, it would be ill-advised to rest
the challenge on the inadequate development of Chinese criminal law.
Although China is still making progress toward a greater respect for
the rule of law,231 its criminal system is exceedingly well-developed.
Criminal law has always been considered “a prominent branch of law
in the Chinese legal system.”232 If there is any inadequacy in the Chinese criminal system, the inadequacy lies in a lack of procedural safeguards and judicial independence, problematic evidentiary standards,
local protectionism, and corruption.233 Under-enforcement, however,
is rarely a problem.
In fact, criminal law is one of the most established branches of law
not only in China but throughout the world. According to Shang Shu
(The Book of Documents), “by about 2200 B.C. [during the Xia Dynasty], the words crime and penalty were [already] known in ancient
China.”234 Dating back to at least a millennium before the time of
Confucius235 (who was given a nonhereditary post as a Minister of
Crime at a young age)236 and close to four millennia before the establishment of the American Republic, penal law in China was so dominant that some commentators have wondered whether ancient
Chinese law was mostly, and unduly, penal.237 Even in the intellec231. For rule-of-law developments in China, see generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed.,
2009); RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW
(2002); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds.,
2000).
232. JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 261 (2008).
233. See, e.g., JONATHAN HECHT, OPENING TO REFORM?: AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW (1996) (exploring the limitations of the revised
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law).
234. REN XIN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION: LAW, STATE, AND
SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA 37 (1997); see also id. (“Although there was no archaeological evidence of the existence of formally written law at the time of the Xia
Dynasty, Shang Shu recorded the earliest forms of the ‘five penalties’—tattooing,
disfigurement, castration, mutilation, and death—that were believed to be the
components of Yü xing in the Xia Dynasty (2100–1600 B.C.).”); id. at 127 (“According to ancient legal documents, China began to use penal facilities to confine
those found guilty of crime as early as 770 B.C.”).
235. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 969–74; Yu, Piracy,
Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 39, at 32–34.
236. See Marvin Wolfgang, Foreword to REN, supra note 234, at ix (“As a young man,
Confucius (550–479 B.C.) was given the first nonhereditary post as Minister of
Crime in the government of Lu.”).
237. See, e.g., DAN C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 50 (2003) (“As Confucianism viewed law primarily as a
mechanism to maintain social control, the Tang Code and its successors were
chiefly criminal in nature, which contributed to a general perception among the
populace that law was something to be feared.”). Noted Chinese legal historian
Philip Huang, however, disagreed: “The conclusion [that the Qing legal system
was predominantly penal and gave little attention to civil matters] . . . does not
square with the documentary evidence. Archival case records have shown us that
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tual property field, an area in which China had very limited experience, a criminal law provision (Article 127) appeared as early as the
late 1970s—in the 1979 Criminal Law that was promulgated shortly
after the Cultural Revolution and the country’s reopening to foreign
trade.238
Moreover, as William Alford reminded us, the problem with China
is not a lack of laws, but the existence of too many.239 To some extent,
the United States seems to have been overwhelmed by not only the
sophistication and complexity of the Chinese criminal system, but also
the regulatory maze and abundant laws that can be implicated by intellectual property crimes. As one U.S. trade official told me in frustration, it is really difficult to litigate over a set of “infinitely
manipulable” laws. Whether the laws are infinitely manipulable or
just highly complex, of course, is in the eye of the beholder.
If these challenges are not enough, it is important to remember
that the United States had made a conscious and calculated choice not
to push hard for criminal enforcement in China in the early 1990s. As
Joseph Massey, the former Assistant USTR for Japan and China, recalled, the United States made a decision not to press for criminal
penalties for intellectual property piracy in China in the early-to-mid1990s because of concern over political repression.240 Although many
in the first Bush and Clinton administrations considered this approach appropriate and politically palatable, it has now backfired on
the United States by making enforcement problems more difficult to
tackle.241 To some extent, it may now be just too late for the United
States to fight a battle that it intentionally gave up two decades ago.
Although the above discussion explained why the United States
lost the first, and arguably its most important, claim, it is worth using

238.

239.

240.

241.

the Qing legal system in fact dealt regularly and frequently with civil cases.”
PHILIP C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND
THE REPUBLIC COMPARED 23 (2001).
DIMITROV, supra note 161, at 148; accord NIE, supra note 60, at 214 (“Historically,
the earliest provision on criminal penalties of infringement of intellectual property rights was Article 127 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China
(1979). It provided criminal penalties such as less than three years’ imprisonment, detention and fine for acts of violation of trademark regulation and for
passing off another person’s trademark as one’s own.”).
See William P. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 21
(1994) (noting that he was “tempted to write an article entitled ‘Why China Has
Too Much Law—And Too Little Legality’ ”).
See Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 234 (2006);
accord DIMITROV, supra note 161, at 147 (“Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, it has not been desirable or politically viable for the United States to encourage police involvement in any type of policy implementation.”).
See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 30.
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counterfactual reasoning to explore whether rights holders would
have received stronger intellectual property protection had the United
States prevailed. After all, the intellectual property industries continue to insist that they could have won the claim, because there was
sufficient evidence to show China’s non-compliance in the criminal enforcement area.242
The answer to this particular question, unfortunately, is “it depends.” Ultimately, the answer depends on whether criminal (and
most likely judicial) enforcement will provide a more effective deterrent than administrative enforcement. In China, administrative enforcement can be more effective than judicial enforcement under
certain circumstances and outside Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and
other major cities.243 Administrative enforcement is also cheaper,
quicker, more flexible, and less antagonistic.244 Many rights holders,
indeed, have found this form of enforcement effective in addressing
the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China.
By comparison, judicial enforcement protects rights holders from
corruption and local protectionism.245 It also allows for damage compensation and pre-litigation remedies.246 With the introduction since
the 1990s of specialized courts with judges possessing intellectual
property expertise, courts in major cities have greatly improved.247
As a result, rights holders in these cities have increasingly resorted to
242. The panel report was unclear on this point. For example, it stated:
There is no indication that probative evidence on this point would be
difficult to obtain. Indeed, it can be noted that more specific information
on prices and markets in China is contained in various US exhibits, notably information on prices of products in a report on Cinema and Home
Entertainment in China prepared by Screen Digest and Nielsen NRG
(submitted in support of the claim regarding the Copyright Law) and in
annexes to a letter from Nintendo of America to the United States Trade
Representative.
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.630 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the panel made clear that “[t]he information in the exhibits would not
necessarily have been sufficient.” Id. ¶ 7.631.
243. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 946–47.
244. See id. at 946. Likewise, Carlos Correa noted:
It has been noted . . . that criminalization may entail some disadvantages for right holders as “the rights owner has no control over the case,
has to submit to the slow pace of criminal cases, and does not as a rule
receive any compensation.” But this is not always the case, as in many
instances the right holder can participate in criminal procedures, which
may be faster than civil litigation, and judges are also authorized to determine damages. Instead, the main hurdle for right holders may be the
need to produce clear and convincing evidence about the infringement,
while a preponderance of evidence may suffice in civil litigation.
Correa, supra note 2, at 42 (footnote omitted).
245. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 946.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 946–47.

R
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the use of courts.248 In short, administrative enforcement has both
strengths and weaknesses, and there is no one-size-fits-all solution for
rights holders doing business in China.
Moreover, the presence of a parallel enforcement system may suggest limited improvements even if China has been found to have failed
to provide the required criminal measures. Article 61 of the TRIPS
Agreement explicitly demands criminal enforcement.249 However, it
does not define the term “criminal” for the purposes of the Agreement.
Nor did the Agreement’s drafters intend the obligation to encroach on
each WTO member’s ability to design its domestic criminal system.
Thus, had the criminal thresholds been found to be inconsistent with
the TRIPS Agreement, China could arguably re-label its administrative measures criminal or incorporate those measures into the Criminal Law. As Brazil rightly recognized in its third party submission,
“[i]t seems to be overly formalistic to assume that because a domestic
legal system qualifies monetary fines as administrative penalties, the
core substantive issue of the deterrence capability of the remedy
should be put aside.”250 Moreover, as Donald Harris pointed out, lowering the criminal thresholds would not necessarily “ensure a corresponding rise in criminal prosecutions or, for that matter, a reduction
in infringement.”251
Determining what is considered criminal for the purposes of the
TRIPS Agreement is, indeed, rather difficult. Such a determination is
also highly political—a task that WTO panels would prefer not to undertake, especially in view of its primary objective of resolving trade
disputes. Different countries subscribe to different concepts, values,
cultural and historical traditions, and underlying philosophies. Except for such heinous crimes as murder, what is criminal in one country may not be so in another.
Moreover, China has a longstanding penal law tradition, even
though it did not have a Western-style criminal law system until the
arrival of Westerners and their gunboats. A major cause of the Opium
War in the mid-nineteenth century was, in fact, the differences between the Chinese and Western criminal law systems—in particular,
the Chinese insistence on “guilty until proven innocent” and “a life for
a life.”252 One therefore could aggressively debate whether some
forms of administrative or penal enforcement could be classified as
criminal for the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement.
248. See id. at 947; see also CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS 12 (2004) (stating that, in 2002, the total numbers of patent and
trademark cases adjudicated were 2080 (an increase of 30.24% over 2001) and
707 (an increase of 46.68%), respectively).
249. TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
250. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.673.
251. Harris, supra note 46, at 186.
252. See IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 152 (6th ed. 2000).
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To be certain, criminal enforcement may require something to be
done by “procedures initiated by or on behalf of the state to punish
offences against the common well-being”—a definition Australia advanced in its third party submission.253 However, ex officio administrative enforcement—including the so-called administrative
detention,254 which is widely used in China—arguably could satisfy
this definition. Fortunately for the panel, neither the United States
nor China argued whether administrative enforcement measures in
China could satisfy Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.255 The issue
was, therefore, left for another day. Had China pushed harder on this
particular issue, it would, indeed, be interesting to see how the panel
would rule.
Moreover, for a country that went through the Cultural Revolution, numerous class struggles, and hundreds, if not thousands, of
mass campaigns, it is fair to question whether the Chinese would view
criminal law the same way as Americans—or, for that matter, other
Westerners. Ted Fishman, for example, noted the cynical nature of
the oft-conducted enforcement raids on piracy and counterfeiting:
The purposes behind the publicized raids are always obscure, and the Chinese
who read about them are skeptical about taking the raids at face value. Are
they the result of turf wars among the government fiefdoms that are themselves knee-deep in counterfeiting? Did the raided factories push the Party’s
tolerance of violent and eroticized Western entertainment too far? Did they
pirate a movie backed by the Chinese government? Or was that day’s demonstration of will just a show for a foreign trade group coming to China to—yet
again—express its grave concerns over intellectual-property theft?256

The key to deterrence in a criminal system is getting offenders to
know what crime they have committed and what punishment such
crimes exact. If they do not know why they are punished or assume
cynically that their stated crime is just a pretext for other things they
did—or worse, a large political ploy to please foreign government officials or trade groups—the law will not have a strong deterrent effect
no matter how stiff the criminal penalties are. The increasing push
for criminal measures also does not take into consideration the grow253. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex C–2, ¶ 4.
254. For discussions of administrative detention in China, see generally Sarah Biddulph, The Production of Legal Norms: A Case Study of Administrative Detention
in China, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 217 (2003); Randall Peerenboom, Out of the
Pan and into the Fire: Well-Intentioned but Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in China, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 991
(2004).
255. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.478 (“[N]either party to
the dispute argues that administrative enforcement may fulfil the obligations on
criminal procedures and remedies set out in Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Therefore, the Panel does not consider this issue further.” (footnote omitted)).
256. TED C. FISHMAN, CHINA INC.: HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD 236 (2005).
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ing volume of literature questioning the deterrent effect of criminal
penalties.257
From the standpoint of protecting human rights and civil liberties,
“increased criminalization of counterfeiting could become a tool for repression.”258 Such penalties may also be disproportional to the offense in the intellectual property area, especially when the
perpetrator is only a weak link within the chain of command in piracy
and counterfeiting, such as street vendors.259 As Professor Mertha reminded us, “[a] prison sentence often means losing one’s livelihood,
one’s family, and any prospects for a decent job in the future. This is
true all over Asia, but it is particularly true in China.”260 Indeed,
given the strong antipathy toward crimes in Asian societies, criminal
penalties may also carry a much higher penalty than is found in Western countries. As Professor Harris rightly questioned, “whether five
years in a U.S. prison corresponds to five years in a Chinese prison is
unknown.”261
Finally, it is interesting to find the United States taking a strong
position on criminal enforcement when U.S. rights holders—most notably American music and movie industries—have increasingly lobbied for the use of administrative mechanisms, as either a substitute
or an institutional enhancement. As these industries have repeatedly
257. See Harris, supra note 46, at 158 (“Whether criminal penalties deter crime is
questionable. While there are conflicting studies, countless studies have found
that stronger criminal laws have no deterrent effect.”). As Professor Harris
observed:
With regard to China, a recent article investigating the deterrent effect of China’s stronger criminal penalties for robbery found that China’s
stringent penalties, including the death penalty, provided no deterrent
effect despite the fact that penalties for robbery are enforced regularly
with many arrests and quick prosecutions. The study found that during
the period of stronger criminal penalties, rather than slow, economic
property crimes nearly quadrupled. The study concluded that not only
did China’s strict system fail as an effective deterrent, but that it also
diverted resources from preventative measures. There is thus an open
question whether China’s criminal penalties (or any country’s, for that
matter) can deter future infringement.
Id. at 160 (footnotes omitted).
258. Andrew C. Mertha, Shifting Legal and Administrative Goalposts: Chinese Bureaucracies, Foreign Actors, and the Evolution of China’s Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement Regime, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND
POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 161, 180 (Neil J. Diamant et al. eds., 2005).
259. See TRIPS Agreement art. 61 (“Remedies available shall include imprisonment
and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level
of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.”); CORREA, supra note
143, at 449 (“[T]he level of penalties applied . . . must be consistent with that
applied for crimes of ‘a corresponding gravity’. Members have considerable discretion to determine how to apply these standards and, particularly, to establish
which are the crimes of comparable gravity in the national context.”).
260. Mertha, supra note 258, at 180.
261. Harris, supra note 46, at 146.
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noted in the context of internet file sharing, criminal penalties are
slow, intrusive, and highly unpopular.262 In the United States, for example, the unpopular lawsuits the music industry has filed against
individual file sharers have threatened to make the industry “the
most hated industry since the tobacco industry.”263 From the U.S.
standpoint, a preferable approach, therefore, is to develop a more
streamlined administrative process264 or to facilitate greater cooperation between rights holders and internet service providers.265 Because the TRIPS Agreement was drafted with limited anticipation of
developments in the digital environment,266 a blind push for reforms
based on provisions that were drafted in the early 1990s—such as
those in the TRIPS Agreement267—may ultimately undermine the
rights holders’ interests, especially in an age of rapidly-changing technological and business conditions.

262. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 701–09 (2010) [hereinafter Yu, Digital Copyright
Reform].
263. RIAA’s Gaze Turns from Users to ISPs in Piracy Fight, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 19,
2008), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/riaas-gaze-turns-from-users-toisps-in-piracy-fight-20081219.
264. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1410–25
(2004) (proposing an efficient administrative dispute resolution system for peerto-peer file sharing infringement cases); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital
Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions,
19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 149–55 (2005) (discussing “an administrative mechanism to determine when, and on what basis, a particular fair use should be enabled”); Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 262, at 766 (“It may . . . be useful
to introduce a complaint-and-enforcement procedure to examine and respond to
cases where the [online service provider] fails to put back materials on a timely
basis following the receipt of a counter notice.”).
265. For discussions of the graduated response system, see generally Annemarie
Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright
Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81 (2010); Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wakeup Call for Copyright Law Makers—Is the ‘Graduated Response’ a Good Reply?, 1
WIPO J. 75 (2009); Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1374,
1379–94 (2010).
266. See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 923, 933–34 (2008) (citing the information revolution as an example of
those technological changes that the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement failed to
anticipate).
267. See Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and
Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (“TRIPS adjusted the level of intellectual property protection to what was the highest common denominator among
major industrialized countries as of 1991.”); see also id. at 29 (“[T]he 1992 text
was not extensively modified and became the basis for the TRIPS Agreement
adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.”).
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Disposal of Infringing Goods

The second claim concerned the disposal of infringing goods seized
at the border. On its face, the panel’s determination of the failure of
the Chinese customs authorities to properly handle seized goods in
their auctions has greatly strengthened protection for intellectual
property rights holders. In reality, however, the ruling has only minimal impact on U.S. intellectual property interests.
Of all the goods seized at the border, the Chinese customs authorities have already destroyed “over half of [these goods]” when measured against the value of all seized goods.268 “[T]he number of
shipments destroyed far exceeds the number of shipments auctioned,
and . . . in three years Customs has only decided to auction goods
twelve times.”269 Moreover, as the panel acknowledged, the present
panel report covers only imports,270 which represented a mere 0.15
percent by value of the infringing goods disposed of or destroyed in
China between 2005 and 2007.271 Even more problematic, although
the use of auctions constituted a mere two percent of all disposition
outcomes, none of the confiscated imports were auctioned off.272 As
far as effective intellectual property enforcement goes, one has to wonder how China could improve on zero.
In early 2010, China amended its Customs Regulations in an effort
to comply with the panel report.273 The amended Article 27 states
that “the customs may lawfully auction them after the infringement
features have been eliminated; but the imported goods bearing counterfeit trademarks shall not be permitted to enter the commercial channels only by eliminating the trademarks on the goods, except for special
circumstances.”274 As indicated in italics, the new language was
taken directly from Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement (with translation into Chinese and then back to English for this translated
version).275
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.250.
Id. ¶ 7.351.
See id. ¶¶ 7.230–.232.
See id. ¶ 7.232.
See id.
See Decision of the State Council on Amending the Regulation of the People’s
Republic of China on the Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
) (promulgated by
(
the State Council, Mar. 24, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.lawinfo
china.com/NetLaw/display.aspx?db=1&id=8025.
274. Id. ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
275. Compare id. (“[T]he customs may lawfully auction them after the infringement
features have been eliminated; but the imported goods bearing counterfeit trademarks shall not be permitted to enter the commercial channels only by eliminating the trademarks on the goods, except for special circumstances.”), with TRIPS
Agreement art. 46 (“In regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the simple removal
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From the legislative standpoint, the direct transcription of the
TRIPS language into local regulations is intriguing. Taken verbatim
from the “A” text proposed by developed countries during the TRIPS
negotiations,276 the language in Article 46 differs significantly from
the language used in other parts of the Chinese Customs Regulations.
While the TRIPS Agreement and the panel report do not dictate how
laws are to be drafted, China eventually transcribed the TRIPS language for two reasons. First, the use of such language protects China
from future compliance challenges before the WTO with respect to this
particular provision. The amendment therefore puts an end to the
present dispute over the inconsistencies between the Chinese Customs Regulations and the TRIPS Agreement. Second, the adopted
language shows the country’s good faith effort in bringing its laws into
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. It sends a strong signal to the
international community that China takes its WTO obligations seriously. It also allows the country to earn goodwill despite its continuous struggle to improve intellectual property protection.
From the enforcement standpoint, however, the transcribed language has raised some implementation challenges. Whether the
adopted language will provide effective protection to rights holders
will depend on how effective the Chinese authorities implement this
language and whether those authorities can fully internalize the underlying values based on language that may be foreign to them and
that may not have a standard interpretation in the Chinese legal or
regulatory system.
Equally disturbing in the second claim is the United States’ eagerness to challenge what it has called the “compulsory sequence of
steps”277 in Chinese customs procedures. While providing discretion
is not bad per se, and the insistence on discretion is symbolically powerful when linked to the larger U.S. freedom agenda, firms and businesspeople in China—both local and foreign—have repeatedly
complained about China’s problems of corruption and local protectionism.278 As Daniel Chow noted, local protectionism remains “wideof the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit the release of the goods into channels of commerce.”).
276. See Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of
Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 508 (2005) (noting that the GATT Secretariat
“prepar[ed] a ‘composite’ text, which melded all industrialized countries’ proposals into what became the ‘A’ proposal, while the developing countries’ text became
the ‘B’ text”).
277. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex A–2, ¶ 17.
278. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 26–27 (2000) (“Local protectionism in China is widespread and poses
probably the single most significant problem in enforcement against counterfeiting. The trade in counterfeit goods has now become a vital portion of some local
economies, providing employment for otherwise unemployable workers and generating significant revenue for the local economy.”); Li Yiqiang, Evaluation of the
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spread and poses probably the single most significant problem in
enforcement against counterfeiting.”279 The more discretion there is,
the more likely local protectionism and corruption will occur.
After all, the Chinese proverb “the mountains are high, and the
Emperor is far away”280 (shan gao huangdi yuan) remains fairly accurate as far as intellectual property enforcement goes. That proverb is
illustrated well by the experience of a senior USTR official who visited
the Guangdong province shortly after the signing of the 1992 memorandum of understanding between China and the United States. As
Joseph Massey recounted, that official “was [literally] told by a senior
provincial government leader that ‘Beijing’s agreement’ with the US
was ‘mei you guanxi’ (irrelevant) in that southern province.”281
In fact, with the current central-local dynamics in China and the
ongoing heavy decentralization of the central government,282 measures that curtail local discretion might be in the interest of rights
holders, even if these measures sound draconian by U.S. standards.
Today, most government agencies, including the National Copyright
Administration and the Administration for Industry and Commerce,
have become either partially or fully decentralized.283 Because the

279.
280.
281.
282.

283.

Sino-American Intellectual Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving
the Local Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 395–401 (1996) (discussing the problems of local protectionism in the context of intellectual property
enforcement); Jingzhou Tao, Problems and New Developments in the Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRIPS
COMPLIANCE IN CHINA: CHINESE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 107, 109 (Paul Torremans et al. eds., 2007) (listing local protectionism as “the greatest barrier to
intellectual property rights protection in the PRC”); Peter K. Yu, Three Questions
that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.–China Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 412, 421–22 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Three Questions] (discussing the problems of local protectionism in China).
Chow, supra note 278, at 26.
See e.g., Yu, Three Questions, supra note 278, at 422.
Massey, supra note 240, at 235.
See generally C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 75–89 (2009) (discussing the central–local dynamics in China and the increasing decentralization of the central government) [hereinafter BERGSTEN ET
AL., CHINA’S RISE].
See DIMITROV, supra note 161, at 50. As Professor Dimitrov observed:
Currently, only two bureaucracies with IPR enforcement portfolios have
a vertical (i.e., centralized) bureaucratic structure, the GAC [General
Administration of Customs] and the STMA [State Tobacco Monopoly Administration]; both agencies serve as primary revenue generators for the
consolidated national budget; centralization allows the central government to establish better control over the tax revenue it collects from
these agencies. The SAIC [State Administration for Industry and Commerce], the AQSIQ [General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine], and the SFDA [State Food and Drug
Administration] are partially centralized. Other bureaucracies with an
IPR enforcement portfolio are fully decentralized: the Ministry of Culture (MOC), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Health
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General Administration of Customs is one of the two rare government
agencies involved in intellectual property enforcement that still have
a centralized bureaucratic structure,284 it may provide a plausible solution to decentralization-related problems in China. Had the United
States succeeded in introducing more discretion in customs at both the
local and provincial levels, it might have hurt rights holders without
even realizing the potential harm.
To some extent, the demands to inject more discretion into the customs authorities will create the same unintended consequences as the
opening up of China following its accession to the WTO. As Professor
Chow observed in the early days of China’s WTO accession, the commitments the country made in the run-up to the accession would lead
to reduced restrictions on export privileges and the elimination of
state monopoly over trading rights.285 These outcomes, in turn, would
allow pirates and counterfeiters to trade more aggressively with mar(MOH), the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP),
the National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC), and the MPS
(known as the Public Security Bureau or PSB at the local level). The
SIPO [State Intellectual Property Office], though formally decentralized,
functions in practice as a quasi-centralized bureaucracy, since it only
penetrates down to the provincial level, a structure that makes monitoring easier than for bureaucracies with deeper reach.
Id.
284. As Professor Dimitrov described:
Chinese customs is a ministerial-level entity directly under the State
Council. It is hierarchically organized, with the General Administration
of Customs (Haiguan zongshu) (GAC) at the top, followed by a middle
tier composed of the Guangdong Subadministration of the GAC
(Haiguan zongshu Guangdong fenshu), two supervisory offices (in
Tianjin and Shanghai), and forty-one Customs regions. At the lowest
tier of the system, there are 562 Customs houses and offices. Although
there are only 251 central-level staff, collectively the Customs Administration and its affiliated units employ over 48,000 people across China.
Since the 1998 centralization, Customs regions no longer report to their
respective local governments and instead have established direct vertical reporting relationships with the GAC in Beijing.
Id. at 76–77 (footnotes omitted).
285. See CHOW, A PRIMER, supra note 62, at 254. As Daniel Chow elaborated in his
testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission:
To implement some of China’s commitments when it entered the World
Trade Organization, China amended its Foreign Trade Law on July 1,
2004, to eliminate the state monopoly on trading rights. Under the
amended law, except for certain types of goods such as crude oil, cotton,
and certain foodstuffs, which must be traded by state-owned companies,
any business operator has the right to import or export goods after it has
registered with the competent state authorities. The elimination of the
state monopoly over trading rights means that any counterfeiter is now
free to export on its own, without the need to find a complicit state trading company. As a result, many observers expect that counterfeits exported from China will rise sharply in the foreseeable future.
U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 221 (written testimony of Daniel C.K. Chow,
Professor of Law, Ohio State University).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB412.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 50

THE TRIPS ENFORCEMENT DISPUTE

2-AUG-11

15:24

1095

kets that have “a strong appetite for low-priced counterfeit goods,”
such as Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.286 As a result, piracy
and counterfeiting were expected to increase, not decrease, following
China’s accession to the WTO. It is something that both U.S. policymakers and industries knew well in advance.287 It is, therefore,
rather disingenuous to consider surprising the increase in piracy and
counterfeiting in the post-WTO environment.
If these criticisms are not enough, it is rather odd for the United
States to claim that Chinese law is rigid—a non-starter for most Chinese law experts. While the application of Chinese law is sometimes
rigid, due to a civil law tradition, a top-down political structure, and
the legacy of a tightly controlled command economy, Chinese law has
been known for its flexibility.288 For example, discretion and informality have been built into the Chinese legal system. As Peter Corne
explained:
The Chinese have adopted a rationale that lends itself to the creation of
laws that are inherently flexible so that they may be adjusted according to the
vagaries of human behaviour. Such laws allow for wide variation in application as they are customarily expressed as general principles (yuanze). Chinese jurists . . . take this understanding of law to be consistent with socialism,
which considers law as part of the superstructure of society. When economic
relations change, law should change as well . . . .
This provides a rationale for vaguely written, broad laws that allow wide
variation in application . . . .289
286. CHOW, A PRIMER, supra note 62, at 254; accord Chow, supra note 278, at 21.
287. Justin Hughes, Written Statement Before the U.S.–China Economic & Security
Commission 4 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006
hearings/written_testimonies/06_06_08wrts/06_06_7_8_hughes_justin.pdf (written testimony of Justin Hughes, Director, Intellectual Property Law Program,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University) [hereinafter Justin
Hughes’ Written Testimony] (“There have always been substantial doubts that
the Chinese Government could ramp up IP law and IP enforcement quickly
enough following the country’s admission to the WTO. Given the enforcement
challenges faced daily in OECD countries, it is no surprise that we are in the
situation we now face.” (footnote omitted)).
288. For discussions of the built-in flexibilities in the Chinese legal system, see generally PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LEGAL SYSTEM 93–145 (1997); Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1113 (1996); Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion
in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA,
supra note 231, at 163; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 39, at
36–37.
289. CORNE, supra note 288, at 93; see also id. at 94 (declaring that “law should not be
too specific lest it tie our hands and feet in the face of the rapidly changing situation” (quoting the remarks made by Wang Hanbin, Director of the Judicial Committee of the National People’s Congress, in 1985)); id. at 125 (discussing how
flexibility is built into the Chinese legal system as “a deliberate effort to overcome
the inherent limitations of a unitary system of law in a large and incredibly di-
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Thus, in its early days, the Chinese legal system was “in essence as
fluid and changeable as the economy and society which it [was] supposed to regulate [and] the informal aspects of regulatory rules
change[d] as rapidly as the government’s economic policy.”290
In addition, because of rapidly-changing socio-economic conditions,
legislation is often issued “on an interim or trial use basis.”291 Many
foreign businesspeople and commentators, indeed, have found Chinese law too malleable to be fair and effective. Thus, for China observers, it is rather odd for the United States to advance the claim that
Chinese law is inflexible—a claim that does not match the actual reality of the Chinese legal system well.
Moreover, if the United States and its supportive rights holders
want to make sure that the Chinese customs authorities are obligated
under the TRIPS Agreement to destroy the seized goods, asking for
more discretion seems to defeat its intended purpose. As Brazil
rightly recognized in its third party submission:
[T]he United States’ arguments with regard to [the “authority to destroy”] issue appear to be somewhat paradoxical. In general, the less discretion a public agent enjoys, the closer its authority will be to a legal obligation.
Conversely, more discretion means the authority has more leeway to choose
not to follow the prescribed conduct in light of specific circumstances.292

Until the United States can reconcile the paradoxical nature of this
claim, it is unlikely to use the WTO process to successfully induce
more destruction of infringing goods seized at the border.
C.

Copyright Protection for Censored Works

The final claim concerned copyright protection for censored works.
From the beginning, most commentators agreed that the United
States would prevail on that claim. Many Chinese commentators
have also acknowledged the provision’s redundancy, raising questions
about the actual importance of the claim.293
To a large extent, Article 4 was included as a political compromise
in light of concerns over information control and the strong political
leverage of the public security bureaucracy.294 In the early 1990s, the

290.

291.
292.
293.
294.

verse country” and that the process of specification is used to “continually adjust
[the law] to match the social exigencies of the locality in question”).
Id. at 94. As Peter Corne noted, legal drafting, at that time and to a lesser extent
today, was characterized by “principle-like pronouncements; vagueness and ambiguity; undefined terms; broadly worded discretions; omissions; general catch-all
clauses.” Id. at 95.
Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 39, at 36.
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex C–4, ¶ 28.
Cf. id. ¶ 7.129 (“[T]he second sentence of Article 4 of the Copyright Law (that is
not the subject of the claim in this dispute) may already address China’s public
policy concerns with respect to some of these rights.”).
As Professor Mertha recounted:
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introduction of copyright law was one of the key conditions for the renewal of the U.S.–China Bilateral Trade Agreement.295 China, at
that time, had yet to join the WTO. Notwithstanding the Chinese
leaders’ wish to earn U.S. support in its entry to the WTO, introducing
the Copyright Law was rather challenging in a highly politicallycharged environment following the 1989 student protests in
Tiananmen Square. Many conservative hardliners, understandably,
were concerned about how the new statute would affect information
control, not to mention the fact that the law would benefit mostly the
intelligentsia, most of whom these hardliners “eyed with the most suspicion.”296 In the end, Article 4 was added to provide the needed
compromise.
On February 26, 2010, exactly fifteen years after the signing of the
1995 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights with the
United States,297 China amended Article 4 of the Copyright Law to
bring the law into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.298 Because
the first sentence of Article 4 was found to be inconsistent with the
TRIPS Agreement, it was removed.299 The second sentence, which
stated that “[c]opyright owners, in exercising their copyright, shall not
violate the Constitution or laws or prejudice the public interests,”300
remained intact and became the first sentence. This sentence is then
followed by a newly added sentence, which stipulates: “The publication and dissemination of works shall be subject to the administration

295.

296.
297.
298.

299.

300.

In the post-June 4 period, many conservative elements in the government felt that the copyright debate involved issues of ideological “correctness” and that such issues should be explicitly included in the
[Copyright Law]. By contrast, copyright proponents argued that ideological issues should not clutter up the Copyright Law—that the [Copyright
Law] should not be used as a blunt instrument for meting out punishment for ideological crimes—and that such issues should be covered by
the Criminal law. This debate was particularly protracted, and it resulted in the compromise that was enshrined in Article 4 . . . .
ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 125 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 124 (noting that the United States “insisted that China establish a
copyright law as a condition for renewing the U.S.–China Bilateral Trade
Agreement”).
Id. at 215.
Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, U.S.–China, Feb. 26, 1995, 34
I.L.M. 881 (1995).
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (
)
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), art. 4, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=186569
[hereinafter Amended Chinese Copyright Law].
Compare Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 179, art. 4 (including the first sentence of Article 4), with Amended Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 298, art 4
(removing the first sentence of the original Article 4).
Amended Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 298, art. 4 (author’s translation).
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and supervision of the state.”301 To many observers, the effect of the
law stays the same, even though the first sentence in the original provision has now been deleted, a new sentence was added to replace the
deleted provision, and copyright holders technically will have protection for works that cannot be published or disseminated. In short, the
United States’ victory seems to be rather symbolic, if not hollow and
academic.
To begin with, the problematic sentence in Article 4 has a narrow
scope302 and has never been used in any previous case.303 Many Chinese scholars also acknowledged that the provision was redundant.304
The impact of the success in this claim on intellectual property rights
holders, therefore, is likely to be minimal. In fact, the law has created
confusion among judges and lawyers. For example, in the case concerning the work “Inside Story of the Surrender of the Japanese
Armed Forces in China,” cited by the United States in the WTO submissions, Article 4 has raised a question about whether the book
should be banned if “the publication of [it] violated administrative regulations but the content of [it] did not violate any laws.”305
Even more problematic, by asserting this claim, the United States
has forced the WTO panel to openly admit that countries are free to
censor content. As the panel declared, “[t]he right of a government ‘to
control, or to prohibit’ the ‘circulation, presentation, or exhibition’ of
any work or production clearly includes censorship for reasons of public order.”306 While it is good, from the United States’ standpoint, to
have the WTO panel find against China in a TRIPS-related dispute, it
is rather unfortunate to have the WTO panel openly recognize a country’s power to censor. It is one thing to be aware of this unpleasant
reality, but another thing to have the WTO formally and openly recognize a WTO member’s right to censor. Indeed, a growing number of
commentators have lamented how U.S. foreign policy at times has
misjudged its priorities by placing economic interests above free
301. Id. (author’s translation).
302. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.134 (noting China’s
claim that “Article 4(1) of the Copyright Law is an exceedingly narrow provision
of law with negligible implications in the marketplace and in terms of any nullification or impairment of benefits to [WTO] Members”).
303. See id. annex B–1, ¶ 75 (“The United States has not provided to the Panel a
single example of a case where a defendant in a copyright infringement action
successfully has asserted a defence that the work did not enjoy copyright because
it failed a content review process.”).
304. Cf. id. ¶ 7.129 (“[T]he second sentence of Article 4 of the Copyright Law (that is
not the subject of the claim in this dispute) may already address China’s public
policy concerns with respect to some of these rights.”).
305. Id. ¶ 7.51.
306. Id. ¶ 7.126.
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speech concerns.307 The panel report also sends a misguided signal to
other countries that continue to heavily restrict the free flow of information. As Daniel Gervais observed, “even if the report will have a
limited legislative impact in China, it . . . may influence the course of
events in other countries—for example in the Persian Gulf—that have
censorship systems that include a denial of copyright protection.”308
The implications of this dispute therefore go beyond China.
Even worse, within China, the panel report has provided fodder for
the conservative factions within the Chinese leadership to push for
not only stronger censorship controls, but also more resources and
power in the enforcement area. After all, it bears no reminder that
provincial copyright authorities are often subordinated to the Press
and Publications Administration, the agency in charge of propaganda
and information control.309 To some extent, the panel report provided
an unintended opportunity for the public security bureaucracy to demand greater power and resources as a compromise for supporting a
semantic change in the Copyright Law. From the human rights
standpoint, the claim on Article 4 was shortsighted; it led to serious
adverse consequences for the democratic reforms China has made over
the past two decades.
Moreover, it is rather ironic that the United States argued the
Berne Convention claims with such conviction and self-righteousness
when the country itself had refused to join this important international copyright treaty for more than a century.310 This point is certainly not lost on those less developed countries that joined the Berne
Convention before the United States. This point also resonates well
with the United Kingdom, France, Canada and those other countries
that repeatedly complained about losses caused by the United States’
failure to protect copyrighted works of foreign authors.311 Many coun307. See Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case that Started from a
Parody: American Intellectual Property Policy and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in Modern China, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 237, 254–59 (2009); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 25, at 173–74; see also KISHORE MAHBUBANI, THE
NEW ASIAN HEMISPHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE SHIFT OF GLOBAL POWER TO THE EAST
102 (2008) (“The tension between Western interests and Western values is vividly shown in the West’s attitude to the rise of Asia.”).
308. Gervais, China—IP Measures, supra note 32, at 553.
309. See MERTHA, supra note 294, at 136–40 (discussing the provincial politics involving the National Copyright Administration and the National Press and Publications Administration and the hierarchical difference between bureau (ju) and
department (chu)).
310. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 349 n.139 (2003)
[hereinafter Yu, The Copyright Divide].
311. For a discussion of the United State’s failure to protect copyrighted works of foreign authors in the nineteenth century, see generally id. at 336–53. For a discussion of the worldwide dissatisfaction with the United States’ failure to protect
foreign authors, see SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: A CANADIAN
HISTORY (forthcoming 2011) (discussing Canada’s dissatisfaction with the United
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tries, in fact, still question whether the United States is in full compliance with the Berne Convention in light of its limited protection of
moral rights.312
It is equally ironic that the United States pushed for stronger protection of performers’ rights under Article 14 of the TRIPS Agreement,313 given the country’s limited protection for audiovisual
performers and its refusal to join the International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations (commonly known as the Rome Convention).314 It is
also troubling that the United States seemed to have forgotten its past
history of denying protection to obscene or immoral works, which
China was quick to remind the panel.315 As Ann Bartow noted, until
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the
obscenity defense to copyright infringement in Mitchell Brothers Film
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater in 1979,316 “copyright protection was

312.

313.
314.

315.

316.

States’ failure to protect foreign authors); Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 65, at
285–86 (discussing Australia’s frustration over the United States’ historical refusal to comply with international copyright norms).
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37 (2010) (“[T]here is the stark reality that we may not be in compliance with our obligations under the Berne
Convention.”).
See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶¶ 7.154–.160.
See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; see
U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 125 (testimony of John McGuire, Senior Advisor, Screen Actors Guild) (lamenting the lack of protection for audiovisual performers and noting in the testimony that “as relates to piracy, the U.S. too often
is viewed as being hypocritical when it talks about stopping piracy on the
grounds that the proceeds should properly be shared not only with the producers
but the creative community, and then the producers and for that matter, . . . the
U.S. government at times actually stops the types of treaties that would have
created these rights for the performers”).
See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex B–4, ¶ 104 (“The US
law similarly subsumes protections for the rights of authors in obscene works,
and in particular works of child pornography.”). Nevertheless, China overstated
its case. See Second Submission of the United States, China—Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights ¶ 195, WT/DS362/
1 (May 27, 2008), available at http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/
Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Settlement_Listing
s/asset_upload_file631_14436.pdf (questioning China’s misstatement of U.S. law
that “through its obscenity laws, [the U.S.] similarly extinguishes the rights of
authors” and noting that “[t]he U.S. Copyright Act does not extinguish copyright
in any category or subject matter of otherwise copyrightable works”). Today,
most U.S. courts grant copyright protection to all works, including even pornographic works. See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604
F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
604 F.2d at 858.
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effectively unavailable for pornography, though it was unambiguously
available for other photographic and audiovisual works.”317
To some extent, the present WTO dispute reminds one of how
much the U.S. position has changed in its run-up to joining the Berne
Convention and its growing active role in shaping the international
intellectual property regime. It therefore underscores the need for
countries, in particular those in the less developed world, to calibrate
their intellectual property system based on local needs, interests, conditions, and priorities.
To be certain, it seems hypocritical for the United States to assume
the position of the world’s champion of the Berne Convention when it
has refused to join the Convention for most of its life. As the late Barbara Ringer, the former U.S. Register of Copyrights, reminded us:
“Until the Second World War the United States had little reason to
take pride in its international copyright relations; in fact, it had a
great deal to be ashamed of. With few exceptions its role in international copyright was marked by intellectual shortsightedness, political
isolationism, and narrow economic self-interest.”318 More importantly, however, the dispute shows vividly the dynamic nature of
changes in the international intellectual property system, the failure
of the one-size-fits-all model, and the need for individualized paths for
each WTO member. It also raises questions concerning the attempts
by the United States—and, for that matter, other developed countries—to “kick[ ] away the ladder” that will help less developed countries succeed.319
D.

Summary

In retrospect, the arguments the United States advanced throughout the WTO process and the outcome of the decision strongly reflect
the common mistakes foreign businesses make when they conduct
business in China. For example, some of these businesses have mistaken the lack of rule-of-law developments for the lack of laws in
China. It is, indeed, rare to find Western policymakers or media dis317. Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography: Reconsidering Incentives to Create
and Distribute Pornography, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 75, 80 (2008).
318. Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright—
Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1051 (1968).
319. FRIEDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Sampson S.
Lloyd trans., A. M. Kelley 1977) (1885); CHANG HA-JOON, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002). In addition to
“kicking away the ladder,” developed countries, like the United States and members of the European Union, have also used bilateral, plurilateral, and regional
trade and investment agreements to induce less developed countries to “trade
away” their ladder. See Kevin P. Gallagher, Trading away the Ladder? Trade
Politics and Economic Development in the Americas, 13 NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
37 (2008).
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cussing the abundance of laws, regulations, rules, and other normative documents within the system.
Many businesses have also underestimated the complexity of the
Chinese legal system.320 As Randall Peerenboom reminded us, the
system includes “a bewildering and inconsistent array of laws, regulations, provisions, measures, directives, notices, decisions, and explanations.”321 Added to the laws (falu), regulations (guizhang), and
rules (guize), which caught the most attention of foreign investors, are
normative documents, such as banfa (measures), guiding (provisions),
xize (detailed rules), shishi xize (detailed rules for implementation),
mingling (orders), ling (decrees), zhiling (directives), jueyi (resolutions), jueding (decision), zhishi (instructions), gongbao (public announcement), and tongzhi (circulars).
In addition, by narrowly focusing on the business at hand—such as
intellectual property enforcement in this case—businesses may have
ignored the complicated spillover effects a non-intellectual property issue (such as decentralization of government, local protectionism, or
corruption) will have on intellectual property protection and
enforcement.322
In short, if U.S. intellectual property rights holders are to receive
more meaningful protection of their intellectual assets, the United
States’ enforcement strategy will need to be revamped. A better and
deeper understanding of the limitations of this panel report—and perhaps the mistakes the United States has made—may provide some
clues to make the strategy more effective. Part V.B will utilize these
clues to develop principles for a new U.S.–China intellectual property
enforcement strategy. Such development is particularly important
considering the growing economic strength of China and the strong
likelihood that more bilateral trade disputes will surface now that the
country has become the second largest economy in the world.323
320. As Harold Chee noted in the business context:
Another rule is not to underestimate the Chinese. Many Western firms
do this; I’ve seen it happen time after time. The Chinese may not look
sophisticated or slick when compared to their Armani-suited Western
counterparts. But let me assure you they know your company and Western practices much better than you know China and its ways of doing
things.
HAROLD CHEE WITH CHRIS WEST, MYTHS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 98
(2004).
321. Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 205 (2001).
322. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 22, at 852–53 (discussing the trichotomy of “IP-relevant,” “IP-related,” and “IP-irrelevant” causes
of the access-to-medicines problems in less developed countries).
323. See David Barboza, China Overtakes Japan to Become No. 2 Global Economic
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at B1.
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Finally, as the panel made clear in the closing paragraph of its report, the dispute was not so much about whether China had offered
adequate protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Rather, it focused narrowly on three discreet claims.324 As the panel
explained:
[Its] task was not to ascertain the existence or the level of trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy in China in general nor to review the desirability of strict IPR enforcement. The United States challenged three specific
alleged deficiencies in China’s IPR legal system in relation to certain specific
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel’s mandate was limited to a
review of whether those alleged deficiencies, based upon an objective assessment of the facts presented by the parties, are inconsistent with those specific
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.325

Both China and the United States are in agreement that the intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting problems are serious in
China. What they disagree on, however, is whether they can resolve
the problems quickly, whether there will be more costs than benefits
to the country if China does so, and whether the TRIPS Agreement
actually requires China to make those costly efforts to strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement. Indeed, as the panel
report has shown, some of the claims and arguments the United
States advanced have gone beyond what the TRIPS Agreement
requires.
IV. THE SILVER LININGS
The previous Part has shown that the United States’ WTO challenge against China was rather misguided, especially when viewed
from the standpoint of U.S. rights holders and in light of the country’s
longstanding interests in promoting human rights, civil liberties, and
the rule of law. Not only does this challenge fail to provide sustained
improvements in the area of intellectual property protection and enforcement, it also signals to other less developed countries that the
TRIPS Agreement does not require the high TRIPS-plus standards of
intellectual property protection and enforcement that are now being
advanced through bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and investment agreements as well as the proposed ACTA. Nevertheless,
the panel report has some silver linings.
A.

United States

First, through the present dispute, the United States sent a strong
signal to China about its willingness to use the WTO process to resolve disputes. This signal, in turn, may lead to further negotiations
both within and without the intellectual property arena. To some ex324. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 8.5.
325. Id.
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tent, it is important not to look at the WTO process in clinical isolation
from other strategies deployed by the U.S. administration. The WTO
process is part and parcel of a larger American intellectual property
policy toward China, which includes meetings of the JCCT (in particular its IPR Working Group)326 and the newly-established U.S.–China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue.327
When viewed as an integrated effort to improve intellectual property protection and market access for intellectual property-based
goods and services, the resolution of the dispute has helped advance
bilateral discussions, even though some of these discussions and other
cooperative efforts undoubtedly have been frozen during the WTO process. Part of the original intent of the WTO complaint was to bring
pressure to bear on China, with the hope that some of the issues—
whether specified in the complaint or elsewhere—will be resolved,
with or without reaching the final stage of the WTO process.
Second, through the WTO process, the United States has learned a
great deal about China’s legal reasoning and WTO strategies. The
panel report also reveals how the WTO panels will evaluate China’s
unique legal structure and measures (such as those judicial interpretations that have normative effects).328 This information is useful not
only for the U.S. administration, but also for American rights holders.
After all, both countries are likely to use the WTO process frequently as a means to resolve trade disputes, given the immense volume of trade between China and the United States. Since the United
States filed complaints against China over intellectual property enforcement and market access of cultural and entertainment products,
it has also filed complaints over financial information and electronic
payment services, grants and loans, exportation of raw materials, and
anti-dumping and countervailing duties.329 In return, China has also
326. The JCCT was established in 1983. See Jon W. Dudas, Written Statement Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on Issues Before the U.S.–China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade 2 (June 9, 2005), available at http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/com/speeches/2005jun09.pdf (written testimony of Jon W. Dudas,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office). Its IPR Working Group was
formed two decades later in April 2004. See id.
327. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue was originally established by the Bush administration in 2006 as the U.S.–China Strategic Economic Dialogue. See JOHN
NAISBITT & DORIS NAISBITT, CHINA’S MEGATRENDS: THE 8 PILLARS OF A NEW SOCIETY 157 (2010).
328. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶¶ 7.417–.424 (discussing
the normative effects of judicial interpretations).
329. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Concerning
Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011); Request for Consultations
by the United States, China—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain
Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, WT/DS414/1 (Sept.
20, 2010); Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Mea-
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launched WTO challenges against the United States in the areas of
anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and poultry and tire imports.330 Out of the eight complaints China filed with the WTO, six of
them were against the United States.
Third, through the various submissions and oral statements, the
United States and its rights holders successfully obtained on record
detailed information about how censorship regulations, customs procedures, and criminal thresholds operate in China. For example, they
now understand that “[w]here no authorized edited version had been
created, [China] would enforce copyright in the legal portion of the
original work against copies of an unauthorized edited version.”331
They also learned the complex ways that the Chinese authorities calculate criminal thresholds and the fact that they count as “evidence of
preparation and attempt” those inchoate goods and implements used
to manufacture pirated or counterfeit goods.332 They even found new
information of which they were not fully aware, such as the Law on
Donations for Public Welfare.333
In the future, all of this information will be very useful to protect
the interests of rights holders. The United States will also be able to
use this information as well as claims China made before the WTO
panel to induce China not to change its position. The collected information therefore will create an estoppel effect, providing certainty,
clarity, and predictability in the area.

330.

331.
332.
333.

sures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/1 (Sept. 20, 2010); Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Related to the
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/1 (June 25, 2009); Request for
Consultations by the United States, China—Grants, Loans and Other Incentives,
WT/DS387/1 (Jan. 7, 2009); Request for Consultations by the United States,
China—Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS373/1 (Mar. 5, 2008).
Request for Consultations by China, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from China, WT/DS422/1 (Mar. 2, 2011); Request for Consultations by China, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/1 (Sept.
16, 2009); Request for Consultations by China, United States—Certain Measures
Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, WT/DS392/1 (Apr. 21, 2009); Request for
Consultations by China, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/1 (Sept. 22, 2008); Request for Consultations by China, United States—Preliminary Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China,
WT/DS368/1 (Sept. 18, 2007).
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.20.
Id. ¶ 7.483.
See id. ¶ 7.316 (stating that the United States “was unaware of the existence of
[the Law on Donations for Public Welfare] at the time of its first written submission, stating that ‘nothing appears to prevent public welfare organizations from
selling the infringing goods they receive’ ”).
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To some extent, this panel report produces information that the
United States worked hard but failed to obtain through an earlier request under Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.334 That request
partly failed as a result of the United States’ broad interpretation of
the permissible scope of inquiry and a WTO member’s obligation to
honor such an inquiry.
China’s reluctance to comply with that request is understandable.
While the production of information—such as the number of criminal
cases brought, the disposition of those cases, and the type of criminal
actions taken—could provide information to dissuade the United
States from taking WTO action, it is more likely that the produced
information will be used as evidence for a WTO challenge.
Finally, the report may provide the momentum needed to push at
the international level for greater improvements in intellectual property protection and enforcement in China.335 As a dispute of first impression before the DSB, this panel report will pave the way for future
WTO challenges in the area of intellectual property enforcement
against China and other countries. At the very least, the report signals to other WTO members the United States’ willingness to push
hard on intellectual property enforcement issues through the WTO
process.336
Even if the USTR is reluctant to initiate another WTO challenge
on intellectual property enforcement in the near future, the present
report will help rally developed, emerging, and other like-minded
countries to set a higher benchmark for intellectual property enforcement. A good example is the recent demands for a new definition of
the term “commercial scale” through bilateral, plurilateral, and re334. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 926 (discussing the United
States’ Article 63.3 request to China, along with similar requests from Japan and
Switzerland, which formally request “clarifications regarding specific cases of
IPR enforcement that China has identified for the years 2001 through 2004, and
other relevant cases”).
335. As two practitioners have noted:
[T]he fact that both sides won parts of their arguments may actually
make future co-operation easier. For instance, . . . China’s obligation to
make changes to its IPR legislation may provide an occasion for the US
to engage China in a broader discussion on other aspects of Chinese IPR
legislation that the US considers inadequate. China did not lose face,
but the panel did not clear China of all charges, either. Its findings may
prove to be just the right mix: they give the Chinese government some
scope for manoeuvre but at the same time emphasize the need for compliance with TRIPs.
Jan Bohanes & Adrian Emch, WTO Panel Report on China IPR: A Mixed Result,
CHINA L. & PRAC., Mar. 2009, at 19, 20.
336. See Harris, supra note 46, at 186 (“[B]y filing the complaint, the United States is
demonstrating its willingness to pursue WTO actions against China for intellectual property rights violations. This signals that future WTO actions are imminent if China does not honor its commitments.”).
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gional trade and investment agreements as well as the proposed
ACTA337—a point China raised in the dispute.338 By underscoring
how the TRIPS Agreement has failed to address exported, in-transit,
and re-exported goods, the United States, despite losing part of the
claims on customs measures, may be able to use this panel report to
its advantage to create a sense of urgency among its trading partners
for strengthening intellectual property enforcement norms. As Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan insightfully observed, the panel’s clarifications on the limited scope of the TRIPS Agreement have hinted at the
“rationale for several TRIPS-plus initiatives in the field of border
measures.”339
B.

China

The panel report enables China to understand better its TRIPS obligations through the eyes of a neutral third party. It provides both
certainty and clarity to the country’s TRIPS-related obligations. More
importantly, the report provides the reformist factions within the Chinese leadership with an important push for stronger reforms within
the country. In China, the reformists are constantly challenged by
their more conservative counterparts, who are uncomfortable with the
country’s rapid socio-economic changes and the resulting social ills.340
By providing the much-needed external push that helps reduce resistance from conservative leaders, the panel report has helped accelerate reforms in the area of intellectual property protection and
enforcement.
In addition, China’s participation in the WTO process has helped
the country raise what I have called the “WTO game.”341 In addition
337. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 18.
338. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.581.
339. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, China—Intellectual Property Rights: Implications
for TRIPS-plus Border Measures, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 620, 626 (2010).
340. See Michael E. DeGolyer, Western Exposure, China Orientation: The Effects of
Foreign Ties and Experience on Hong Kong, in THE OUTLOOK FOR U.S.–CHINA
RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1997–1998 SUMMITS: CHINESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE 299, 300 (Peter Koehn
& Joseph Y.S. Cheng eds., 1999); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 25, at
195–96.
341. See Peter K. Yu, The US–China WTO Cases Explained, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.,
Oct. 2009, at 39; see also Han Liyu & Henry Gao, China’s Experience in Utilizing
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO:
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 137, 148–53 (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2010) [hereinafter DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO]
(discussing the growing role of Chinese lawyers in both the WTO process and the
proliferation of municipal government WTO centers); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 392–96 (2006) [hereinafter Yu,
TRIPS and Its Discontents] (discussing the need for less developed countries to
take advantage of the WTO dispute settlement process).
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to human resources, litigation capital, and legal capacities, a successful player will need more finely-honed skills and a deeper knowledge
of the different facets of this game. The more a country plays the
WTO game, the more familiar and better it will become. To date,
China has relied substantially on outside counsels to provide submissions to the DSB.342 However, it is imperative that China can eventually play the game better with its own players.
Learning how to play this game well, indeed, has become increasingly important. The present dispute is likely to be the first of a long
series of intellectual property-related challenges the United States
will initiate against China in the near future. Any experience China
earns in the intellectual property area can also spill over into other
areas covered by the various WTO agreements.
Moreover, as this dispute has shown, many of the claims China
needs to make require both the mastery of Chinese law and a deeper
understanding of local conditions and cultural contexts. It is simply
difficult for foreign counsels to get up-to-speed on all the nuances and
complexities in Chinese law. It is even more difficult to get them to
master the fine legal and administrative details in areas outside intellectual property and international trade—in this case, criminal law,
customs procedures, and censorship regulations. In fact, some of the
underlying concepts, values, and concerns in these laws may sound
counterintuitive to counsels that were educated or trained abroad.
Finally, the gains in the panel report will put China in a better
bargaining position in its ongoing intellectual property-related negotiations with the United States. As Gregory Shaffer reminded us:
[P]articipation in WTO political and judicial processes are complementary.
The shadow of WTO judicial processes shape bilateral negotiations, just as
political processes and contexts inform judicial decisions. If developing countries can clarify their public goods priorities and coordinate their strategies,
then they will more effectively advance their interests in bargaining conducted in WTO law’s shadow, and in WTO legal complaints heard in the
shadow of bargaining. They, in turn, will be better prepared to exploit the
“flexibilities” of the TRIPS Agreement, tailoring their intellectual property
342. Such reliance, however, may change in the future. As Han Liyu and Henry Gao
observed:
In the cases in which China participated as a main party, whether as a
complainant or respondent, it generally would retain a foreign law firm
(mostly either US or European) to assume the main responsibilities for
developing legal arguments. At the same time, the foreign law firm was
asked to work with a domestic Chinese law firm which was assigned to
the case. In this way, the government provided the domestic law firm
with an opportunity to observe, practise and learn from the litigation
experience. In cases in which China participated as a third party, the
domestic Chinese law firms usually play a much bigger role. Indeed, one
of the main reasons that China has participated actively as a third party
in WTO cases . . . is to give domestic law firms an opportunity to learn
the rules and practice of WTO dispute settlement through real cases.
Han & Gao, supra note 341, at 148.
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laws accordingly, and will gain confidence in their ability to ward off US and
EC threats against their policy choices. In other words, developing countries’
international legal strategies have implications for their leverage in international political negotiations and for the policy space in which they implement
domestic intellectual property and public health regimes.343

In the shadow of this panel report, and the gains China has made in
the criminal enforcement area, the country will now have a better negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States in future bilateral discussions. If China chooses to assert its newfound leverage at the
multilateral level, the report may even help shape laws in the international intellectual property system. This panel report, therefore, may
have serious implications not only for China and the United States,
but also for other WTO members.
C.

Other Less Developed Countries

Although the panel report covers only the dispute between China
and the United States and technically has no clear precedential value
for disputes involving other less developed countries,344 the report
benefits the developing and least developed countries in a number of
ways.
First, the report underscores the importance of minimum standards. Mentioning the term “minimum standard” or its plural form
fourteen times, the WTO panel reminded us that the TRIPS Agreement is primarily a minimum standards agreement. In so doing, the
panel report recognizes the flexibilities retained in the TRIPS Agreement and explicitly affirmed in paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration.345 The report also underscores the autonomy and policy space
reserved for less developed countries during the TRIPS negotiations.
Particularly notable in this report is the panel’s meticulous effort in
discerning China’s obligations in the criminal enforcement area and
its willingness to openly “acknowledge[ ] the sensitive nature of criminal matters and attendant concerns regarding sovereignty.”346
Second, the panel reminded us that “intellectual property rights
are private rights,” a key principle that is explicitly stated in the pre343. Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 459, 476–77 (2004).
344. For discussions of the unsettled nature of this issue, see generally Raj Bhala, The
Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14
AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare
Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
& POL’Y 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
873 (2001).
345. Doha Declaration, supra note 21, ¶ 5.
346. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.501.
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amble of the TRIPS Agreement.347 The panel also made it clear that
“the phrase ‘shall have the authority’ does not require Members to
take any action in the absence of an application or request.”348 Taken
together, the report underscores the individual responsibility of intellectual property rights holders in protecting their own intellectual assets. Mindful of Article 41.5 of the TRIPS Agreement, the panel
indicated its willingness to explore the unfairness of shifting the burdens and risks of protection to governments in less developed countries—a warning that is worth taking into account with respect to the
highly controversial ACTA.349 Indeed, the panel noted clearly, in the
closing paragraph of the panel report, that its task was not “to review
the desirability of strict IPR enforcement.”350
Third, the panel carefully rejected the use of recently-negotiated
bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and investment agreements
as a relevant subsequent practice for determining the term “commercial scale.”351 Although China advanced the United States–Australia
Free Trade Agreement as an indication of how the current U.S. definition of “commercial scale” had yet to be adopted at the time of the
TRIPS negotiations,352 the WTO panel rejected the use of such a document, taking note of the interpretive rules laid out in the Vienna Con347. Id. ¶ 7.530; see also Li Xuan, Ten General Misconceptions About the Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 14, 27 (Li Xuan & Carlos Correa eds., 2009) (“As with
any other kind of private rights, the enforcement of IP rights is primarily a matter concerning individual owners of these rights. It is the primary obligation of
right-holders and not governments to enforce their claimed rights and take necessary legal actions for protecting their own IPRs.”).
348. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.247.
349. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 18 (criticizing ACTA for shifting the burdens
and risks of protection to governments).
350. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 8.5.
351. See id. ¶ 7.581.
352. For example, the United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement stated:
Wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale includes:
(i) significant wilful infringements of copyright, that have no direct
or indirect motivation of financial gain; and
(ii) wilful infringements for the purposes of commercial advantage or
financial gain.
USAFTA, supra note 121, art. 17.11.26(a). As China explained:
There would be no reason to negotiate this definition with countries that
already are subject to the TRIPS obligations, if the terms already had
this meaning in TRIPS. On the contrary, the US insistence on developing a stricter definition in the bilateral context underscores that “commercial scale” as set forth in TRIPS is a broad concept that permits
considerable national discretion. It is an acknowledgement that the
United States failed to secure in the TRIPS Article 61 negotiations the
obligation that it nonetheless seeks to impose here.
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex B–1, ¶ 25.
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vention on the Law of Treaties.353 Because U.S. free trade
agreements are negotiated on a bilateral or plurilateral basis and
China is not a party to any of these agreements, the documents would
not constitute subsequent practice within the meaning of the Vienna
Convention.
While the panel rejected China’s argument that it should consider
those agreements, the outcome actually benefited not only China, but
also other less developed countries. For example, the panel pointed
out: “In response to a question from the Panel, the United States confirmed that its own Copyright Law was only amended in 1997 to deal
with the problem of massive infringement, such as via the Internet,
even if the infringing activity is not necessarily pursued for financial
gain.”354 The panel also “emphasize[d] that its findings should not be
taken to indicate any view as to whether the obligation in the first
sentence of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement applies to acts of counterfeiting and piracy committed without any purpose of financial
gain.”355 To some extent, the panel concurred with China’s position
that, under the TRIPS Agreement, “criminal enforcement is required
if the infringing activity is on a commercial scale, not if the impact of
the infringing activity is on a commercial scale.”356
Fourth, the panel was willing to look to local conditions to determine the term “commercial scale.”357 Even better, the panel demanded substantive evidence, finding it insufficient to rely on mere
anecdotal evidence, such as allegations in nonauthoritative press articles or highly aggregated data in consultant and industry reports.358
By focusing on the need to appreciate local conditions and by taking
an evidence-based approach, the panel report helps slow down the
ongoing push for one-size-fits-all—or more precisely, super-size-fitsall—standards through the TRIPS Agreement and other international
agreements.
Finally, the report gives hope to less developed countries, which
have become more frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement process in recent years.359 It is important to remember that the present
353. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
354. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.660; see also No Electronic
Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (amending the U.S. Copyright Act to extend criminal liability for copyright infringement to individuals
who have not made any monetary profit through their infringing activities).
355. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 7.662.
356. Id. annex B–1, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).
357. See id. ¶ 7.604.
358. See id. ¶ 7.629.
359. See Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that “the
US and the EC no longer were as dominant as complainants in the system” and
that “developing country use of the system increased dramatically” in the second
half of the first decade of operation of the WTO dispute settlement process); see

R
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dispute is only the second involving a developing country that focused
primarily on the TRIPS Agreement and that resulted in the release of
a WTO panel report. In the first dispute, the United States and later
the European Communities successfully challenged, through parallel
proceedings, the failure of India to establish a mailbox system in its
patent law pursuant to Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement.360 The
result was a clear-cut victory for the United States and the European
Communities.
In this second dispute, however, the result is mixed. Even in an
area where developed countries have historically dominated, such as
intellectual property protection and enforcement, developing countries
are now doing much better in the dispute settlement process than they
did in the early days of the TRIPS Agreement. The benefits of the
WTO dispute settlement process, indeed, have begun to trickle down
to less developed countries.
Most recently, India and Brazil filed complaints against the European Union and the Netherlands over the repeated seizure of intransit generic drugs.361 Although it remains to be seen whether either of these two complaints will become the first complaint from a
less developed country to result in the establishment of a WTO panel,
the European Union’s recent agreement with India362 to amend its
regulation on customs border measures363 already suggests the growing ability of less developed countries to take advantage of the WTO
dispute settlement process to influence bilateral discussions. Even if
India ultimately settles with the European Union, the dispute between Brazil and the European Union could still remain.
Given the potential of this panel report to benefit less developed
countries in future WTO disputes, it is rather disappointing that less
developed countries—with the exception of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
also David Evans & Gregory C. Shaffer, Introduction to DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT
WTO, supra note 341, at 1, 2 (noting that “no African country has ever initiated a [WTO] dispute” and that “only one Least Developed Country . . . initiated a
dispute, and that dispute did not progress beyond the consultation phase
(Bangladesh)”).
Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R
(Aug. 24, 1998).
Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State—
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); Request for
Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010).
See India–EU Generic Drug Row ‘Resolved’ at Brussels Summit, BBC NEWS (Dec.
10, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11971568.
Council Regulation 1383/2003, Concerning Customs Action Against Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights and the Measures to Be
Taken Against Goods Found to Have Infringed Such Rights, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7
(EC).

THE

360.

361.

362.
363.
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and Thailand—did not participate in the process more actively and
use third party submissions to provide a louder voice for the less developed world.364 To some extent, the lack of participation from less
developed countries represents a lost opportunity, especially when
viewed in light of their growing success in establishing development
agendas at the WTO and WIPO and in other international fora.365
V. THE ROAD AHEAD
A.

Lessons for Intellectual Property Rights Holders

In addition to the United States, China, and other WTO members,
the panel report has provided intellectual property rights holders with
many valuable lessons. First, enforcement is controversial at both the
domestic and international levels. It is no coincidence that a comprehensive set of minimum international enforcement standards were
not introduced into any multilateral agreement until the signing of
the TRIPS Agreement.366 Although the United States, pushed by
Levi Strauss, sought to introduce an anti-counterfeiting code toward
the end of the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations, the proposal eventually failed.367 Even during the TRIPS negotiations, the enforce364. It is worth contrasting the lack of such participation with China’s active participation as a third party in the WTO dispute settlement process. As Professors
Han and Gao observed:
China has actively participated in WTO dispute settlement as a third
party in almost every dispute filed after August 2003. As of November
2009, China has participated in a total of 62 WTO cases as a third party.
This makes China the fifth most active participant as a third party following Japan (90); EC (82); US (73); and Canada (64), even though
China only joined the WTO in December 2001. Of the cases where China
has been a third party, four have been concluded between the parties
with mutually satisfactory solutions.
Han & Gao, supra note 341, at 154 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 159–60
(discussing China’s participation in the WTO process as a third party).
365. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 20, at 511–40.
366. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the pre-TRIPS international intellectual
property conventions contain some isolated enforcement provisions. As Professor
Correa noted in the ICTSD-UNCTAD Resource Book on the TRIPS Agreement:
[T]he Paris Convention includes Article 9 (seizure upon importation of
goods bearing infringing trademarks and trade names), Article 10 (false
designation of source or geographic origin), Article 10bis (protection
against unfair competition), and Article 10ter (general requirement for
“appropriate legal remedies effectively to repress” acts prohibited under
Articles 9, 10, and 10bis).
The Berne Convention also contains some provisions on enforcement
(Articles 13(3) and 15), while they are absent in other important treaties
such as the Rome Convention, the Geneva Phonograms Convention, the
Universal Copyright Protection and the Washington Treaty.
TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 629–30.
367. See DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 9 (2002) (discussing the push for an anti-counterfeiting code
during the Tokyo Round); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
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ment issue was so controversial that developing countries demanded
the inclusion of Article 41.5 in the TRIPS Agreement.368 Until recently, less developed countries have remained reluctant to explore
stronger enforcement standards at both the WTO and WIPO.369
To some extent, many of these countries are still dealing with what
Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis have described as the “Uruguay Round ‘hangover’ ”370—or more precisely, TRIPS veisalgia. On
the one hand, these countries are concerned about the already high
standards required by the TRIPS Agreement with which they had
great difficulty in complying following the expiration of the transitional periods.371 On the other hand, they are also very concerned
about the growing TRIPS-plus obligations developed countries have
imposed upon them through new bilateral, plurilateral, and regional
trade and investment agreements.372 Greater enforcement in excess
of the TRIPS Agreement was a concern China and India recently
raised in the TRIPS Council.373
Moreover, stronger intellectual property enforcement cannot be developed from intellectual property laws alone. It requires the development of what I have called an “enabling environment for effective
intellectual property protection.”374 Such an environment includes

368.

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

374.

GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 40–41 (2003) (same); see also
Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods, L/
4817 (July 31, 1979), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SUL
PDF/90960212.pdf (providing the text of the draft anti-counterfeiting code).
See CORREA, supra note 143, at 417 (“[Article 41.5] was introduced upon a proposal by the Indian delegation, and essentially reflects developing countries’ concerns about the implications of Part III of the [TRIPS] Agreement.”); TRIPS
RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 585 (noting that Article 41.5 “was in fact one of
the few provisions in Part III where developing countries’ views made a difference”); see also TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9, annex B–4, ¶ 33
(“Articles 1.1 and 41.5 were key concessions to the developing world, which the
United States and other developed third parties seek now to dismiss and
disregard.”).
See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 18.
BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 111 (2007).
See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 341, at 379–86 (discussing the
impact of the TRIPS Agreement on less developed countries).
See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 2, at 392–400.
See Catherine Saez, Health Waiver, IP Enforcement Discussed at Lively WTO
TRIPS Council Meeting, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 10, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://
www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/06/10/health-waiver-ip-enforcement-discussed-atlively-wto-trips-council-meeting/ (reporting that China and India “voiced concerns about efforts by developed countries to introduce provisions into trade
agreements that reach beyond the TRIPS agreement, referred to as ‘TRIPS-plus’
measures”); see also Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, supra note 8 (discussing
China and India’s criticism in the TRIPS Council of TRIPS-plus enforcement
trends).
See Yu, The China Puzzle, supra note 25, at 213–16.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB412.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 70

THE TRIPS ENFORCEMENT DISPUTE

2-AUG-11

15:24

1115

such key preconditions for successful intellectual property reforms as
a consciousness of legal rights, a respect for the rule of law, an effective and independent judiciary, a well-functioning innovation and
competition system, sufficiently-developed basic infrastructure, a critical mass of local stakeholders, and established business practices.
As Robert Sherwood reminded us in an aptly titled article, Some
Things Cannot Be Legislated, “until judicial systems in developing
and transition countries are upgraded, it will matter little what intellectual property laws and treaties provide.”375 Likewise, Keith Maskus, Sean Dougherty, and Andrew Mertha wrote:
Upgrading protection for IPRs alone is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for [the purpose of maximizing the competitive gains from additional innovation and technology acquisition over time, with particular emphasis on raising
innovative activity by domestic entrepreneurs and enterprises]. Rather, the
system needs to be strengthened within a comprehensive and coherent set of
policy initiatives that optimize the effectiveness of IPRs. Among such initiatives are further structural reform of enterprises, trade and investment liberalization, promotion of financial and innovation systems to commercialize new
technologies, expansion of educational opportunities to build human capital
for absorbing and developing technology, and specification of rules for maintaining effective competition in Chinese markets.376

To some extent, enforcement facilitation—that is, the provision of
measures to help facilitate enforcement—is just as important as enforcement. While countries have explored the need for greater trade
facilitation to support trade, they have yet to fully appreciate the importance of enforcement facilitation. Nor have they the political will
to push for measures to make such facilitation possible.377
Fortunately, the need for such an “enabling environment” has begun to receive greater attention in the international policy arena. The
November 2009 session of the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement, for example, underscored the need to “[i]dentify[ ] elements for
creating an enabling environment for promoting respect for intellectual property in a sustainable manner and future work.”378 As noted
in Pakistan’s submission to the advisory committee, entitled “Creating
an Enabling Environment to Build Respect for IP”:
[A] very limited approach to combating infringement of IP rights, in which, in
essence, stricter laws and capacity building of enforcement agencies is seen as
375. Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 37, 42 (2002).
376. Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development
in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT
ECONOMIC RESEARCH 295, 297 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
377. See MOISÉS NAÍM, ILLICIT: HOW SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 257–58 (2005); Yu, Three Questions, supra note
278.
378. WIPO, Advisory Committee on Enforcement [ACE], Draft Agenda, WIPO/ACE/5/
1 Prov. Rev (Sept. 28, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enf
orcement/en/wipo_ace_5/wipo_ace_5_1_prov_rev.pdf.
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the primary means to ensure enforcement . . . can temporarily reduce IPR
infringements levels, but cannot address the challenge in a sustainable manner. A broader strategy is urgently needed to allow the establishment of conditions in which all countries would have shared understanding of the socioeconomic implications of enforcement measures, and direct economic interest
in taking such measures. In such an environment, countries’ choice to enforce
IPRs will be derived from their internal rather than external factors.379

Likewise, Brazil pointed out in its paper: “Violations of intellectual
property rights do not take place in the void. They are not disconnected from concrete political and social variables.”380 That paper
also heavily criticized the one-size-fits-all model of intellectual property enforcement while at the same time calling for a change in the
committee’s focus from enforcement of intellectual property rights to
respect for intellectual property itself.381
Third, the WTO dispute settlement process has its limits. Although U.S. industries have high hopes for this mandatory process to
provide the much-needed antidote to the decades-old piracy and counterfeiting problems in China, WTO panel reports are lengthy, complex, and detailed. As a result, each party in the dispute is likely to
score some important points, regardless of whether it has an overall
win or loss in the dispute.382 A better and more reliable solution,
therefore, seems to be one that focuses on bottom-up developments in
the country383 while facilitating greater collaboration between U.S.
379. Creating an Enabling Environment to Build Respect for IP: Concept Paper by Pakistan ¶ 2, in ACE, Conclusions by the Chair, annex 1, WIPO/ACE/5/11 (Nov. 4,
2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_5/
wipo_ace_5_11-annex1.pdf.
380. Future Work Proposal by Brazil, pt. C, in ACE, Conclusions by the Chair, annex
2, WIPO/ACE/5/11 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
enforcement/en/wipo_ace_5/wipo_ace_5_11-annex2.pdf.
381. See id.
382. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 942; see also Bohanes &
Emch, supra note 335, at 19 (noting that having both sides claim victory is “a
frequent phenomenon in the world of WTO litigation between sovereign
governments”).
383. See MERTHA, supra note 294, at 215 (noting in the case of copyrights that “topdown pressure did little to alter the incentives of local enforcement agencies or
the local governments that had personnel and budgetary jurisdiction over them”);
id. at 225 (“Top-down pressure can result in dramatic, substantive changes in
China’s legislative, regulatory, and policymaking processes, but this same form of
pressure has little, if any, sustained effect on the implementation and enforcement stages.”); Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective, in GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 2, at xiii,
19 (“Historical evidence and contemporary research suggests that institutional
change occurs only gradually and is more frequently brought about by bottom-up
evolution rather than top-down planning.”); Yu, The China Puzzle, supra note 25,
at 216–19 (discussing the importance of developing an analytical focus on microlevel, qualitative developments).
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industries and Chinese stakeholders.384 After all, as Martin Dimitrov
has shown recently, while “enforcement volume is sensitive to both
domestic and foreign pressure, . . . domestic considerations have a primary impact on the overall volume of enforcement.”385
Finally, intellectual property rights holders need to be proactive if
intellectual property protection in China is to be strengthened.386
There is only so much a government can do on behalf of private rights
holders. For all the complaints they have made about a lack of intellectual property protection and enforcement in China, the USTR obtained only thirty-four submissions pursuant to its initial request for
comments on China’s compliance with WTO commitments.387 It is no
wonder that the United States was unable to muster up sufficient evidence to challenge the thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in China.
Likewise, it is not uncommon to find intellectual property rights
holders failing to make proactive effort to protect intellectual assets.388 Researchers from McKinsey & Company, for example, have
found that many executives in the Chinese operations of multinational corporations in intellectual property-sensitive industries “think
of protecting IP solely in legal terms—and sometimes only after property has been stolen.”389 Experienced attorneys in China have also
been troubled by the limited budget foreign businesses have allocated
to intellectual property enforcement in the country. As Catherine
Sun, a leading intellectual property attorney in China, noted in frustration, “in the U.S., companies spend millions of dollars in patent litigation. But, they are not willing to allocate adequate budgets to
China IP enforcement, instead hoping miracles will occur.”390
B.

A New Intellectual Property Enforcement Strategy

Given the lessons the panel report has provided and the need for
the United States to revamp its intellectual property enforcement
384. For a series of articles articulating the need to transform China from a pirate to a
partner, see generally Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 25; Yu, From
Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25. See also BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE,
supra note 282, at 85 (“The United States . . . will have to build interest coalitions
in China that are not just top down but also offer a broader national consensus,
including at the local level, in favor of US positions. Such interest coalition building may require more nuance, patience, and effort than most Americans are used
to exercising.”).
385. DIMITROV, supra note 161, at 93.
386. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 949–51.
387. Id. at 929.
388. See id. at 949–51.
389. Meagan C. Dietz et al., Protecting Intellectual Property in China, MCKINSEY Q.,
Aug. 2005, at 6.
390. SUN, supra note 248, at 16.
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strategy vis-à-vis China, one has to wonder what strategy the United
States and its rights holders should adopt. Although there has yet to
be any easy or quick solution to providing dramatic improvements on
intellectual property protection and enforcement in China, and commentators have repeatedly noted the lack of a “magic bullet,” this Part
outlines five principles that policymakers can use to revamp their intellectual property enforcement strategy. These principles take into
account not only the unique and rapidly-changing local conditions in
China, but also the past challenges to U.S. efforts in strengthening
intellectual property protection and enforcement on the ground.
1.

Understand Provincial and Local Differences

The first principle was developed as a direct response to the significant regional differences within China. As I pointed out in the past,
China is “a country of countries.”391 The country is large, complex,
diverse, and “sometimes internally contradictory.”392 The Chinese
speak different languages, enjoy different cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and subscribe to different historical and philosophical
traditions. Conditions in Beijing are often very different from those in
Guangzhou, intellectual property strategies that are effective in
Shanghai are likely to fail in a village in Guizhou, and the trade patterns found near the coasts are very different from those found inland.
To some extent, the need for a regional approach in China reminds
one of the approach Charles Dickens’ publisher, Ticknor and Fields,
used more than a century ago. At that time, the United States was
still at the stage of formative development—not that different from
China a decade ago. As Zorina Khan recounted, “[i]n 1856, the [publisher] sold over $10,000 worth of books in Cincinnati, an amount that
was equal to its sales in the entire South. The company spent more on
advertising in the city of New York in 1856 than it did for all the
states in the South.”393 If Ticknor and Fields planned its marketing
strategy without treating the developing American market as homogenous, one has to wonder why the U.S. government and many of its
rights holders continue to ignore the many significant regional differences within China.
Of all the strategies the USTR employed to evaluate the regional
impediments to obtaining dramatic improvements in intellectual
property protection and enforcement in China, the most promising is
the push for a special provincial review. In June 2006, the USTR
391. Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 963.
392. John J. Hamre & C. Fred Bergsten, Preface to C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA:
THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER ix (2006).
393. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 239 (2005).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB412.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 74

THE TRIPS ENFORCEMENT DISPUTE

2-AUG-11

15:24

1119

steered its focus away from country-level assessment, which it has
used for more than a decade. For the first time, it requested information concerning provincial developments in China. As stated in the
announcement in the Federal Register, “the goal of this review is to
spotlight strengths, weaknesses, and inconsistencies in and among
specific jurisdictions.”394
The use of a provincial approach is important, for several reasons.
First, such an approach will help enhance the understanding of the
divergent protections offered in different parts of the country. Given
the sometimes drastically different socio-economic conditions within
China, a nationwide assessment of intellectual property enforcement
tends to be misleading, if not meaningless. As a representative of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted in his testimony before the
U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission: “[T]he root
of China’s IP problem resides in the provinces. It is . . . absolutely
critical that we cultivate the support of the provincial/local officials, as
well as local industry, if IP enforcement is to be addressed in a truly
meaningful way.”395
Second, by identifying the “hot spots” of piracy and counterfeiting,
a provincial approach will help give credit where credit is due. It will
also help reduce the frustration of many Chinese—policymakers and
otherwise—especially those in regions that have undertaken successful intellectual property reforms or that have made considerable sacrifices in making a transition to a regime that is more respectful of
intellectual property rights. While intellectual property protection
continues to be a problem for foreign rights holders throughout China,
one cannot deny the many important developments in the major cities
and coastal areas in the past two decades.
Moreover, a blind insistence on greater enforcement throughout
the country without acknowledging the important success some provincial and local governments have achieved would create resentment
among a large portion of the Chinese population, which continue to
regard the USTR’s repeated threats and demands as “American excesses.”396 Such insistence would also foster a misimpression among
local Chinese leaders that the U.S. government and foreign businesses
will never be satisfied no matter what they do. This misimpression
would not only erect further barriers to future cooperation, but also
394. Special Provincial Review of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Request for Public Comment, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,969, 34,970 (June 16, 2006).
395. U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 88 (written testimony of Myron Brilliant,
Vice President, East Asia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.).
396. See N. MARK LAM & JOHN L. GRAHAM, CHINA NOW 321 (2007) (noting that foreign
countries sometimes consider repeated threats and demands for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights from the United States to be “American
excesses”).
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make it difficult for the administration and rights holders to cultivate
useful local allies.
Third, a continued insistence on significant overall improvement in
the country is simply unrealistic, ineffective, and counterproductive.
An intellectual property enforcement strategy that insists on the complete eradication of piracy and counterfeiting in China would be as
futile as the hope to achieve zero leakage in the digital environment.397 Although some commentators have predicted, in the run-up
to China’s accession to the WTO, that “pirates and counterfeiters [in
China] will . . . gradually move into legitimate businesses[,] and the
focus of counterfeiting and piracy will shift away from [the country] to
lesser developing countries, such as Vietnam,”398 close observers of regional developments in China will quickly point out that piracy and
counterfeiting problems are likely to stay in China in the near future.
To be certain, the intellectual property protection and enforcement in
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities and coastal areas have greatly improved, in part due to the emergence of local intellectual property-based industries. Piracy and counterfeiting,
however, have not migrated out of the country.399 Instead, they have
now spread to other parts of the country, whose conditions are no different from those of the big cities a decade ago when intellectual property protection began to strengthen.
Finally, a better and deeper understanding of China’s regional differences could provide useful information to help U.S. industries make
better investment decisions. As Harold Chee, a noted Chinese business expert, reminded us, “[i]f anyone tells you grandly, ‘I’m going into
the China market!’, your immediate reply should be, ‘Where, exactly?’”400 Today, many rights holders are likely to be satisfied if they
obtain secured markets in the metropolitan areas. Thus, improving
intellectual property protection and enforcement in the major cities
and the coastal areas is still important, even if piracy and counterfeiting continue in the poorer parts of the country.
In fact, as regional and local governments fight hard to attract foreign direct investment, the picture in China will become more complicated in the near future.401 Because gains in one region may result in
397. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L.
REV. 13, 72 (2006) (discussing the unrealistic expectation of having perfect intellectual property protection and zero leakage).
398. CHOW, A PRIMER, supra note 62, at 254.
399. See Yu, The China Puzzle, supra note 25, at 206.
400. CHEE WITH WEST, supra note 320, at 9.
401. As Former Assistant USTR Timothy Stratford explained:
[The special provincial review] will create a sense amongst provincial
governors and other leaders that they would rather have a reputation as
a province for being one that upholds intellectual property rather than
for one that disregards it or fails to enforce it.
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losses in another, many local authorities have been particularly concerned about the unemployment and labor displacement problems created by the closure of pirate and counterfeit factories.402 After all,
greater intellectual property enforcement will lead some regions to
suffer more job losses and unemployment than others, due in large
part to a lack of skilled labor, education, technological infrastructure,
and training facilities in the suffering regions.403 The closures induced by intellectual property reforms will also shift production out of
a region or a locality. Thus, if problems are likely to linger for a significant period of time, rights holders may encounter severe local resistance and lax enforcement. The divergent protection may even lead to
“interregional disputes over intellectual property infringement and
enforcement.”404
Unfortunately, for all its many benefits, the USTR’s provincial approach has been discontinued.405 While some policymakers and commentators blamed the discontinuation on the initiation of the present
WTO dispute, others noted the high costs of and challenges in collecting data outside the major Chinese cities. As experts familiar with

402.
403.

404.
405.

So we very much hope that by generating this information and making it public, that it will help inform decision-makers in ways that will
naturally reward those who are doing a good job and penalize those who
are not.
U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 59–60 (testimony of Timothy P. Stratford,
Assistant United States Trade Rep.); id. at 58 (remarks of Michael R. Wessel,
Comm’r, United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission) (“It
appears to me that we could have additional leverage here if we would urge our
companies to reward those provinces that do the right thing, which [sic] ultimately their investment, of course, could aid in job creation, economic growth,
and be a model for those other provinces that are not doing the right thing, and
potentially accelerate the movement towards implementation of the rule of law at
the provincial and local level.”); see also BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE, supra
note 282, at 76 (“A more successful US strategy [in managing trade disputes with
China] may require Americans to build longer-term benchmarks and a process to
verify implementation at all layers of government. That, in turn, may require the
US government to deepen its reach into Chinese provinces and spend time cultivating political relationships outside China’s bigger cities.”); NAISBITT & NAISBITT, supra note 327, at 167 (“In March 2009, China officially authorized its
provinces—effective immediately—to approve proposals for foreign direct investment . . . up to $100 million. The result is that today the vast majority of new
international deals are handled at the provincial level.”).
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 954.
See Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
109, 112 (1998).
Maskus et al., supra note 376, at 298.
Compare USTR, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 42–52 (2007), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file230_11122.pdf (including a section titled “Special Provincial Review of China”), with USTR, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT
(2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_
14869.pdf (lacking a provincial review).
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raids and enforcement have repeatedly pointed out, fighting piracy
and counterfeiting in some areas can be as dangerous as fighting
drugs.406 Some of the strongholds of piracy and counterfeiting also
benefit from local protectionism and corruption.407
2.

Take the Long View

The second principle draws on the Chinese emphasis on taking the
long view. Such emphasis is understandable given China’s more than
four millennia of history. The Chinese perspective is well-captured by
the reported response of Zhou Enlai, the former premier of China,
when he was asked what he thought of the French Revolution: it was
too soon to tell!408
In June 2008, the Chinese State Council promulgated the Outline
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy.409 Since then, China
has undertaken many initiatives to promote domestic innovation,
which quickly attracted criticisms from the U.S. administration and
rights holders. As the USTR noted in the 2010 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers:
A troubling trend that has emerged . . . is China’s willingness to encourage
domestic or “indigenous” innovation at the cost of foreign innovation and technologies. For example, . . . in November 2009, China issued the Circular on
Launching the 2009 National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation
Work with the aim of improving “indigenous” innovation in computer and
other technology equipment. In order to qualify as “indigenous” innovation
under the accreditation system, and therefore be entitled to procurement preferences, a product’s intellectual property must originally be registered in
China.410

While it is understandable that the U.S. administration and rights
holders are concerned about the adoption of policies that discriminate
against foreign companies, it is also important to appreciate the longterm benefits of a policy that calls for greater domestic innovation in
China.
406. Policymakers and commentators have increasingly linked piracy and counterfeiting to organized crime and terrorism. See, e.g., A Growing Problem with Links to
Organized Crime and Terrorism: Hearing on Int’l Copyright Piracy Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003); NAÍM, supra note 377, at 126–28; TIM PHILLIPS,
KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 137–44 (2005); Maureen
Walterbach, Comment, International Illicit Convergence: The Growing Problem of
Transnational Organized Crime Groups’ Involvement in Intellectual Property
Rights Violations, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (2007).
407. See sources cited supra note 278.
408. CHEE WITH WEST, supra note 320, at 5.
409. STATE COUNCIL, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY
(2008), available at http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm.
410. USTR, 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 69
(2010).
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For more than a decade, commentators, myself included, have argued for the need to develop a critical mass of local stakeholders in
China to help push for stronger intellectual property protection from
the inside.411 It is therefore highly encouraging that many Chinese
leaders and nationals now finally understand the importance of domestic innovation. The more innovation there is, the more likely the
Chinese will support greater intellectual property reforms in the
future.
Indeed, the presence of a critical mass of local stakeholders is the
key to successful intellectual property law reforms.412 By locating
support from the inside, these reforms often result in more sustainable protection that is well-tailored to local needs, interests, conditions,
and priorities.413 It is therefore no surprise that the American Chamber of Commerce–China recommended in its 2006 White Paper that
“[s]uccessful realization of [China’s] innovation priorities is the upside
inducement for the Chinese to implement the fundamental reforms
necessary to guarantee protection of IPR.”414
Nevertheless, as I recently testified before the United States International Trade Commission, there are good domestic innovation policies and bad domestic innovation policies—just like any other type of
policies.415 The good ones will help develop a critical mass of local
stakeholders to support the intellectual property system. The bad
ones, by contrast, discriminate against foreign companies. They may
also violate China’s international obligations under the WTO or other
international agreements. There is an important distinction between
the two, and it is important that U.S. policymakers and rights holder
do not throw away the good domestic innovation baby with the discriminatory policy bathwater.
411. See Timothy Trainer, Testimony Before the U.S.–China Economic and Security
Commission, Hearing on Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Dangers of
Counterfeited Goods Imported into the United States 11 (June 8, 2006), available
at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_06_08wrts
/06_06_7_8_trainer_tim.pdf (written testimony of Timothy Trainer, President,
Global Intellectual Property Strategy Center) (noting the need “to address the
true local interested parties—the local entrepreneurs and how they can be commercially and economically empowered to benefit from IP”); Yu, The Copyright
Divide, supra note 310, at 431–33.
412. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 25, at 958–59.
413. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 22, at 890–91.
414. AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE–CHINA, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA 42 (2006),
available at http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/amcham/upload/wysiwyg/2006051
6094503.pdf.
415. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUBLICATION NO. 4199, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR
MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, at D–20 (2010), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf (summarizing the Author’s
testimony).
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While we certainly hope that Chinese policymakers will be able to
develop a right mix of policies that promote good domestic innovation
policies, as compared to discriminatory ones, it is very rare for policymakers to get their policies right from the get-go without trial and
error. This is particularly true when the Chinese policymakers are
only beginning to understand the importance of domestic innovation;
they are actually learning what it means to have more domestic innovation and how to do so. From the standpoint of greater intellectual
property protection and enforcement, the most important and urgent
thing is that the Chinese leaders and people understand the importance and benefits of innovation. Such an understanding is likely to
provide long-term benefits for both the United States and its rights
holders.
Moreover, many of the indigenous innovation policies, including
those criticized by the USTR in the National Trade Estimate Report,
are still at the drafting stage.416 Given the fact that many policies in
the gray areas are likely to undergo further adjustment, and that the
Chinese regulatory system is highly flexible and at times incomplete,
it is rather shortsighted to quickly criticize China’s eagerness to push
for discriminatory measures to promote domestic innovation. Such
criticisms are likely to be counterproductive; they will fuel avoidable
nationalist claims that the United States prefers China to stay weak.
Thus, instead of making such criticisms, more energy and resources should be devoted to help Chinese policymakers separate good
domestic innovation policies from bad domestic innovation policies.
Such separation will help policymakers acquire a better understanding of the policy constraints that emerged as a result of China’s commitments at the WTO or under other international agreements.
3.

Appreciate Local Solutions on Their Own Terms

The third principle calls for a greater appreciation of local Chinese
rules and customs. Put differently, it can be beneficial to think like
the Chinese when assessing the strengths and weaknesses of these
rules and customs. As shown in the present WTO dispute, there is a
tendency for the U.S. administration and rights holders to push for
greater criminal enforcement, as compared to what they call “toothless administrative enforcement.”417 However, as Part III.A has
416. See 2011 NTE REPORT, supra note 63, at 72 (citing as possible concerns the draft
Regulations for the Administration of the Formulation and Revision of PatentInvolving National Standards, which the Standardization Administration of
China released for public comment in November 2009, and the draft measure
issued by the China National Institute for Standards in February 2010).
417. U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 51 (testimony of Timothy P. Stratford, Assistant United States Trade Rep.); see also Letter from Larry M. Wortzel, Chairman,
U.S.–China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, & Carolyn Bartholomew, Vice Chair-
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shown, the effectiveness of administrative enforcement, when compared with criminal enforcement, varies according to local conditions.
While judicial and criminal enforcement may be better in major cities
and for rights holders that focus primarily on exports, administrative
enforcement may work well in other areas (where local knowledge and
linguistic skills are more important). It may also work better for those
who are on the ground and have a long-term relationship with the
region.
The lack of discretion in customs authorities—the second claim in
the present dispute—provides another good example. Although discretion has many benefits, it could have unintended consequences in
places that are confronted with problems of local protectionism and
corruption. Before one makes a hasty judgment toward a certain policy or regulatory approach, one needs to embrace a holistic perspective
and inquire about the reasons behind such a policy or approach, including those that arguably fall outside the intellectual property area.
In fact, as foreigners quickly found out in China, what works at
home does not always work well in China. Although some of the adjustments these foreigners made sounded counterintuitive in the beginning, they made sense and paid off in the end. Today, many of the
highly popular seminars on doing business in China are filled with
tips on how to deploy these seemingly counterintuitive strategies to
increase profit margin.
4.

Don’t Hide the Ball

The fourth principle induces people to reveal the concern as it is,
rather than mask it as something else (in part to earn sympathy in the
public debate at home). In many intellectual property discussions
that the United States initiated in the past two decades, the main concern was not primarily about intellectual property protection and enforcement. Rather, it was about the need for greater market access of
intellectual property-based content.418 It is therefore no surprise that
many policymakers, commentators, and the mass media have frequently misclassified the market access dispute as the second intellectual property dispute.
man, U.S.–China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, to Ted Stevens, Senator, & J.
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House (Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter U.S.C.C. Letter], in U.S.C.C. Hearing, supra note 31, at 3, 5 (noting that administrative enforcement in China “is riddled with local foot-dragging and token penalties”).
418. See, e.g., ZHENG CHENGSI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA:
LEADING CASES AND COMMENTARY xxvi (1997) (“In the 1996 Sino-U.S. negotiations, what the USTR really wanted was not the impossible short term elimination of pirate copies, but access to the Chinese markets for its cultural
products.”).
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Consider the movie industry, for example. The industry has repeatedly complained about the quota China employed to limit the distribution of foreign movies, including those from the United States,
Europe, and other parts of the world. Following its accession to the
WTO, China allowed the importation of slightly more than twenty
movies.419 Thus far, the failure of the U.S. rights holders in exporting
movies has led to their inability to meet the growing demand for Western movies in China.420 As a result, local consumers have no choice
but to turn to other channels, which range from purchasing pirated
optical disks from street vendors to downloading movies from illegal
internet websites.421
The frustration of the U.S. movie industry is understandable. It is
indeed hard to defend many of the content regulations that China has
retained despite its many WTO commitments.422 Nevertheless, when
market access disputes are framed as intellectual property violations,
the claims in the disputes are significantly weakened. For the Chinese, it becomes just another round of foreign bullying in an area that
is of limited domestic priority. For others, it is a stretch that borders
on a reinterpretation of commitments China made in the TRIPS
Agreement.
To some extent, the eagerness to mask a market access dispute as
a TRIPS enforcement dispute may explain why the United States did
well in the market access dispute, but not so well in the TRIPS enforcement dispute. While the United States lost its major claim on
criminal enforcement and had only limited success on the customs
claim in the TRIPS enforcement dispute, it largely prevailed on the

419. See US–China Piracy Skirmish Could Prevent Trade War, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.),
Apr. 14, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 7078845 (“The Chinese government also
imposes draconian restrictions on the number of foreign films which are publicly
screened—typically not more than 20 to 30 a year.”); see also Heiberg, supra note
40, at 234 (noting the pre-WTO annual film importation quota at “a maximum of
twenty films”).
420. See Heiberg, supra note 40, at 236–37; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives,
supra note 39, at 31–32.
421. See Heiberg, supra note 40, at 236–37; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives,
supra note 39, at 31–32.
422. For an excellent discussion on China’s restrictions on cultural products in relation to its WTO commitments, see generally Henry S. Gao, The Mighty Pen, the
Almighty Dollar, and the Holy Hammer and Sickle: An Examination of the Conflict Between Trade Liberalization and Domestic Cultural Policy with Special Regard to the Recent Dispute Between the United States and China on Restrictions
on Certain Cultural Products, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 313
(2007).
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market access dispute—before both the WTO panel423 and the Appellate Body.424
Moreover, the fact that policymakers—and for that matter, commentators—find it ill-advised for the United States to launch a WTO
challenge against China on intellectual property enforcement grounds
does not mean that these same people will always find objectionable a
challenge on market access grounds. Indeed, it is not unusual to find
Chinese policymakers and commentators bitterly divided over these
two issues. Their disagreements are further exacerbated by bureaucratic rivalries, institutional fragmentation, raging turf wars, ideological disagreements, and differences in policy preferences.425 Thus,
even though both intellectual property and market access issues go
hand in hand and may be equally important to intellectual property
rights holders, it is a bad strategy to lump the two issues together—or
worse, mask market access issues as TRIPS violations.
When the TRIPS enforcement dispute was compared with the market access dispute, there is no denying that the highly politically sensitive issues in the latter have created considerable tension between
the U.S. and Chinese governments. However, the panel report on that
dispute may ultimately be more important than the panel report on
the TRIPS enforcement dispute. In fact, the report on the market access dispute may become an important driving force in opening up the
Chinese market for publications, sound recordings, and audiovisual
entertainment products.
5.

Beware of Difference Engineers

The final principle highlights the danger precipitated by those
whom I will call “difference engineers.” In When Cooperation Fails,426
Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer recounted how some interest
groups have successfully captured the debate on genetically modified
foods and crops by enlarging the differences between the United
423. Compare TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 9 (ruling partially in
favor of the United States and partially in favor of China), with Panel Report,
China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12,
2009) (ruling mostly in favor of the United States).
424. See Market Access Appellate Body Report, supra note 227.
425. See CHOW, A PRIMER, supra note 62, at 217 (“Concurrent and overlapping enforcement authority has created bureaucratic and political interests that discourage
cooperation and coordination among various government entities. . . . A number
of [government] entities [such as AIC, TSB, and Customs] continue to upgrade
their enforcement tools against counterfeiting in an effort to increase their capabilities vis-à-vis their bureaucratic competitors in order to corner the market on
intellectual property enforcement.”).
426. MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009).
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States and the European Union over their treatment of these products
for regulatory approval and marketing purposes. As they noted:
[T]he best explanation for the differences lies neither in innate or “essentialist” forms of culture (such as US and European attitudes toward food, risk or
technology) nor in institutions alone (such as US specialized agencies compared to European political processes), but in the ability of interest groups to
capitalize on preexisting cultural and institutional differences, with an important role played by contingent events such as the European food-safety scandals of the 1990s.427

As a result of the efforts by these interest groups, or what I will call
“difference engineers,” the trans-Atlantic divide between the U.S. and
EU regulatory approaches has become more significant than it actually was on close inspection. As Professors Pollack and Shaffer observed, “[i]t was not inevitable that US regulators would adopt a
product-based approach to GMO [genetic modified organism] regulation, nor was it obvious from the outset that the EU would adopt the
strict, politicized, and highly precautionary system that emerged over
the course of the 1990s.”428
Like the differences between the European Union and the United
States over GMO regulation, the differences between China and the
United States in the intellectual property area may not be as significant as the U.S. media or trade groups have reported. In fact, there
are a lot of similarities between the two countries, especially when one
compares the two countries cross-temporally based on their respective
stage of development.429 For example, both China and the United
States are large and diverse, and their nationals can be easily isolated
from other countries. Despite continuous globalization, a large number of both Americans and Chinese have not traveled abroad. To
many of them, it would already have been an eye-opening experience
to visit New York from Montana or to travel from Guilin to Shanghai.
Likewise, the two countries harbor significant differences at the regional and local levels. The policies that New Yorkers support may be
unpopular in South Carolina or Texas. What works perfectly for Beijing may also not work well in the Sichuan province.
Nevertheless, there exist a large and growing number of players
that will benefit from an environment where China and the United
States harbor significant differences. The more differences there are,
the more valuable their expertise will become, and the more they can
influence the policy and business debates. Given the immense benefits differences may bring about, some of these players unavoidably
will seek to exploit the differences to their advantage. When these
differences are enlarged and sharpened, and at times even fabricated,
427. Id. at 5.
428. Id. at 11.
429. See Peter K. Yu, Remember that China, U.S. Need Each Other, DES MOINES REGISTER, Feb. 22, 2009, at 4OP.
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important areas of potential cooperation—including those in the area
of intellectual property protection and enforcement—may be ignored.
Even worse, the enlarged differences may help escalate tension
into conflicts that would require a considerable amount of resources
and political capital to resolve. The two countries will be worse off as
a result. Even if conflicts do not arise, an undue focus on the differences will distract policymakers from finding the much-needed solutions to target the crux of the enforcement problems.
The existence of these differences may even create an illusion
about a country’s enforcement priorities. As Justin Hughes, the current senior advisor to the director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, rightly pointed out in his written testimony before the
U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, “the profligacy of the American trade deficit with China means that even if
every iota of IP infringement in China stopped, [the United States]
would still have a long-term, intolerable trade imbalance.”430 Likewise, two World Bank economists noted that “[t]he U.S. current account deficit . . . largely is due to the lack of domestic savings and not
to China’s barriers to imports (which, in fact, have come down dramatically in recent years) or to an undervalued Chinese exchange rate
(which is a real but fairly recent problem).”431 Given these expert
opinions, one has to wonder why the discussion of piracy and counterfeiting problems in China remain tied to that of the U.S. trade deficit.
After all, most policymakers and commentators know full well that
greater improvements in intellectual property protection and enforcement in China would only have a limited effect on the U.S. trade
deficit.
6.

Summary

The five principles outlined in this Article seek to provide guidance
on how the U.S. intellectual property enforcement strategy can be revamped to ensure stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement in China. Whether a more effective strategy will emerge
ultimately depends on whether U.S. policymakers and industries have
the needed political will to understand intellectual property developments in China on their own terms. It also depends on whether the
United States interacts with China based on what it is, as opposed to
what policymakers assume the country to be or hope it will become.
While the Chinese leaders were repeatedly criticized for their lack
of political will in dramatically improving intellectual property protec430. Justin Hughes’ Written Testimony, supra note 287, at 16.
431. L. Alan Winters & Shahid Yusuf, Introduction to DANCING WITH GIANTS: CHINA,
INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 34 (L. Alan Winters & Shahid Yusuf eds.,
2007).
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tion in China, it is high time that we pay attention to the equal lack of
political will on the part of the U.S. administration and transnational
businesses to push for greater intellectual property enforcement in
China. The limited political will to move intellectual property protection and enforcement to the top of the U.S.–China bilateral agenda is
understandable, given the large variety of issues on the agenda and
the fact that intellectual property does not compare favorably with
other important issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation or currency
exchange.432 Nevertheless, until there is a political will to revamp the
existing U.S.–China intellectual property enforcement strategy, it is
unrealistic to expect significant improvements in intellectual property
protection and enforcement in China.
VI. CONCLUSION
The WTO provided the United States and other members with a
new weapon to induce China to offer stronger intellectual property
protection. However, the international trading body has significant
structural limitations. Even worse, the U.S. strategies for challenging
China’s intellectual property laws before the DSB were seriously
flawed. To a large extent, these flaws resemble those common mistakes foreign investors make when conducting business in China.433
432. See Yu, Three Questions, supra note 278, at 414 (stating that the author has “yet
to meet a U.S. policymaker who picks ‘intellectual property protection’ over” nuclear nonproliferation and currency exchange as the most important issue in the
U.S.–China bilateral agenda); see also U.S.C.C. Letter, supra note 417, at 6 (observing that “the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not placed the
seizure of counterfeit goods among its top enforcement priorities”).
433. As commentators elaborated:
Many in the United States believe that China’s one-party system
gives Beijing total power and control over all levels of government. The
image, perhaps left over from the Maoist cult of personality era, of a
single leader or core group of leaders responsible for and in command of
all aspects of Chinese society still pervades the American imagination.
This perception of absolute authority has led US policymakers and industry groups to focus on securing top-down commitments from Chinese
leaders to resolve bilateral economic and other issues. That the leaders
sometimes do not fulfill these commitments endlessly frustrates the
Americans who have sought them, who view this as negligence on the
part of Chinese leaders, lack of political will, or even outright
malfeasance.
Beijing’s ability to unilaterally impose its will throughout China is,
however, highly limited. For a variety of reasons . . . , China’s authoritarian regime lacks the capacity to implement many of its decisions
throughout the polity, a limitation that has important implications for
policymaking in Beijing. The leadership has to gauge carefully what it
can and cannot get away with vis-à-vis local authorities; how much political capital will be required to enact controversial policies at local levels;
and how much discretion to allow local authorities in policies set at the
national level—recognizing that the center has no capacity to enforce
absolute obedience to its edicts. The policy process can frequently result
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For example, the United States’ complaint and subsequent submissions demonstrate the administration’s unwillingness to take note of
China’s internal challenges in undertaking greater intellectual property reforms. They also reflect an oversimplified, yet politically convenient view taken by U.S. policymakers that often attributes China’s
piracy and counterfeiting problems solely to a lack of political will on
the part of Chinese leaders.
Sadly, despite the considerable amount of time, effort, and resources that have been put into addressing this particular dispute, the
intellectual property enforcement landscape in China remains virtually unchanged. If intellectual property protection and enforcement in
China are to be dramatically improved, it needs more than a single
WTO challenge in the intellectual property area. A complete overhaul
of the U.S. intellectual property enforcement strategy based on lessons from the present dispute is badly needed.

in vague national policy pronouncements that look less like hard and
fast rules than abstract guiding principles—exhortations to local authorities to “do the right thing” that leave considerable latitude for local recalcitrance. Even when Beijing issues more categorical commands, local
compliance is far from certain.
BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE, supra note 282, at 75.

